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ABSTRACT  
The productivity performance of the UK economy in the period 1990-2007 was excellent. 
Based entirely on pre-crisis data, and using a two-sector growth model, I project the future 
growth rate of GDP per hour in the market sector to be 2.61% p.a. But the financial crisis and 
the Great Recession which began in Spring 2008 have dealt this optimistic picture a 
devastating blow. Both GDP and GDP per hour have fallen and are still below the level 
reached at the peak of the boom. So I discuss a wide range of hypotheses which seek to 
explain the productivity collapse, including the impact of austerity. Most of the conclusions 
here are negative: the explanation in question doesn’t work. I next turn to the long run impact 
of financial crises, particularly banking crises, on productivity, capital, TFP and employment. 
Based on a cross-country panel analysis of 61 countries over 1950-2010, I argue that banking 
crises generally have a long run impact on the level of productivity but not necessarily on its 
long run growth rate. I therefore predict that the UK will eventually return to the growth rate 
predicted prior to the crisis. This prediction is conditional on the UK continuing to follow 
good policies in other respects, in particular not allowing the government debt-GDP ratio to 
rise excessively. Nonetheless the permanent reduction in the level of GDP per worker 
resulting from the crisis could be substantial, about 5½%. The cross-country evidence also 
suggests that there are permanent effects on employment, implying a possibly even larger hit 
to the level of GDP per capita of about 9%.  
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1 Introduction  
 
The UK economy went into recession in 2008Q2. GDP fell in that quarter and continued 
falling for the next five quarters. It stopped falling in 2009Q3 and began growing again but so 
slowly that in 2013Q1 its level was still 4% below the previous peak in 2008Q1 (see Table 
1).1 The fall in GDP per capita has obviously been even larger since the population has 
continued to grow. The whole period since 2008Q1 therefore justifies the term “slump” or 
even “depression”. Few if any commentators expected a slump of this severity prior to its 
start. After it became apparent that the recession, though deep, was over many expected the 
recovery to be equally rapid. But this didn’t happen. The recovery has been slow and is still 
incomplete. There have been many surprising features of the five or so years since the 
recession began. First, despite the massive fall in output, unemployment rose comparatively 
modestly from 5.2% in 2008Q1 to a high of 8.4%; in September-November 2013 it was 
7.1%. Second, employment and total hours worked, after falling initially, have been robust: 
employment and hours are both now higher than at the peak (Charts 1 and 2). The flip side of 
these facts is the productivity puzzle: not only has labour productivity (whether measured on 
an hours basis or a heads basis) stopped growing, its level has actually fallen. In 2013Q1 
GDP per hour worked was still 5% below its peak level (Chart 6). All this calls into question 
the future prospects of the UK economy which seemed so bright during the boom. Was it all 
just an illusion? This is the question on which I hope this chapter will throw some light.  
 In 1995 I published an article with the somewhat sceptical title “Supply side reform and 
UK economic growth: what happened to the miracle?” (Oulton, 1995).2 I argued that up till 
the end of the 1970s the growth of the British economy had been hampered by two factors: 
first, our dysfunctional system of industrial relations and second a low level of investment in 
human capital. Despite the title, my conclusion was upbeat. The Thatcher reforms of the 
1980s (reduction of union power coupled with privatisation of state-owned industries), which 
have been maintained and extended by subsequent governments, together with increased 
 
1   2013Q1 is the latest quarter for which national accounts data were available at the time 
this research was undertaken.  
2   Younger readers may like to note that “miracle” was a term attached by some 
commentators in the 1980s to the improvement in productivity growth observed then, 
particularly in manufacturing.  
Commented [42]: The data files and programs behind this paper 
are in C:\Post-Bank projects\UK prospects . Data and programs in 
other directories are also drawn on: 1. C:\BoE 
consultancy\Productivity & QNA; 2. C:\BoE consultancy\TFP-
recession; and 3. C:\Post-Bank projects\ICT & growth\EUKLEMS 
data 
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investment in education, particularly higher education,3 and improvements in primary and 
secondary education, had greatly improved British prospects. So I expected more rapid 
growth would follow. But there was an important caveat. UK performance had also been set 
back by poor macro policies which led to unnecessarily prolonged recessions. Optimistically, 
I thought these could be avoided in the future (provided we did not join the euro). At the 
time, mine was not a popular conclusion, at least in academic circles. A conclusion more in 
line with (then) received academic wisdom can be found in an article published two years 
after mine:  
“While legal intervention has had an impact on the institutions of industrial relations, 
most notably in reducing the power of organised labour, this cannot be isolated from 
wider structural changes in labour and product markets. A review of research on 
economic outcomes suggests an uneven and tenuous link between institutional change 
and economic performance” (Brown et al., 1997).  
 
 However, since these articles were published evidence has accumulated that the UK’s 
performance did indeed improve and growth was faster than in most comparable countries. 
Now the LSE Growth Commission (2013) has set its seal of approval on the view that the 
reforms begun under the Thatcher governments were highly effective in raising UK growth:  
“Despite the current gloom, the UK has many assets that can be mobilised to its 
advantage, including strong rule of law, generally competitive product markets, flexible 
labour markets, a world-class university system and strengths in many key sectors, with 
cuttingedge [sic] firms in both manufacturing and services. These and other assets helped 
to reverse the UK’s relative economic decline over the century before 1980. Over the 
course of the following three decades, they supported faster growth per capita than in the 
UK’s main comparator countries – France, Germany and the US.”4  
 
Perhaps the clearest way to see this is to look at the growth of GDP per hour worked in 
the market sector (thus avoiding incompatibilities in the way public sector output is measured 
in different countries). In Charts 1 and 2 I compare 16 countries over two periods, 1970-1990 
 
3   The proportion of people aged 25-34 in Britain who have a university degree is 
approaching 50% and is the 6th highest in the OECD. This proportion is now higher in the 
UK than in the United States while the proportion aged 25-64 with a degree is close behind 
the US one (OECD 2013).  
4   See too Van Reenen (2013) who also credits the reforms begun in the Thatcher era.   
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and 1990-2007, using the EU KLEMS database (O’Mahony and Timmer 2009). In the first 
period GDP per hour grew at 1.89% p.a. in the UK, the fourth slowest in this group of 
countries, behind France, Germany Italy and Japan amongst others, though slightly ahead of 
the US. In the second period it grew at 2.87% p.a., ahead of all the above countries and 
behind only Ireland, Finland and Sweden.  
  But all this optimistic evidence has been called into question by the world-wide financial 
crisis which has led (most commentators would argue) to the worst recession in the UK since 
the 1930s.5 Figure 1 sets out in schematic form three possible scenarios for the future after a 
crisis-induced recession, labelled “optimistic”, “pessimistic” and “very pessimistic”. Here the 
dashed lines represent trend (potential) GDP per hour, based on pre-crisis conditions. Under 
the “optimistic” scenario the economy recovers, the original trend growth rate prevails again 
(possibly after a lengthy period) and furthermore the level of GDP per hour eventually returns 
to the value it would have achieved if the crisis had somehow been avoided. In other words 
the economy eventually returns to the track (the dashed line) it would have been predicted to 
be on in the absence of the crisis. Of course, even under this scenario the crisis has not been 
costless since there has been a permanent loss of output relative to potential during the 
recession and recovery. But after a bit this is just a bygone. Under the “pessimistic” scenario, 
the economy eventually regains its trend growth rate but it never gets back on the original 
track: GDP per hour is always below what it would have been without the crisis. (It has 
become something of a commonplace to say that the recovery from a financial crisis tends to 
be long and slow. But this statement might describe either the pessimistic or the optimistic 
scenario, because it does not distinguish clearly between levels and growth rate effects). 
Finally, under the “very pessimistic” scenario, not only does the economy never get back on 
the original track but it falls progressively further and further below it. In other words the 
trend growth rate has fallen as a result of the crisis.  
  Which of these scenarios is closer to the truth for the UK? My argument in this chapter is 
that the pessimistic scenario is the most likely: the UK will eventually regain its previous 
trend growth rate but will have suffered a permanent loss in GDP. The main reason for this 
conclusion is that it is what we would expect as a result of a banking crisis (on the basis of 
econometric evidence presented below). This argument is not advanced with 100% 
confidence and clearly much depends on external conditions over which we in the UK have 
 
5   This may be unfair to the 1930s which saw a private house-building boom and 
imaginative infrastructure projects like electrification and the National Grid. The main reason 
the 1930s have such a bad image is the high rate of unemployment.   
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no control. And it also depends on a continuation of reasonably good policies, particularly 
with regard to government debt, as discussed later.  
 
Plan	of	the	chapter	
 
I start in Section 2 by setting out a framework for estimating long run growth, based on a 
neo-classical two-sector model. I argue that two sectors are necessary to take proper account 
of the impact of information and communication technology (ICT), which is of continuing 
importance in my view. I use this model to develop a projection for the long run growth rate 
of labour productivity (output per hour) in the UK market sector. This projection takes no 
account of the financial crisis and is calibrated entirely on pre-crisis data. It shows if you like 
what might have happened (on reasonable assumptions) had the rcession somehow been 
avoided: it corresponds to the dashed lines in Figure 1. Next in section 3 I look at what has 
actually happened to the British economy since the boom came to an end in early 2008. As 
we all know there has been not just a decline in the productivity growth rate but an actual fall 
in the level of productivity from its peak which has yet to be regained. I consider various 
hypotheses that have been advanced to explain the productivity puzzle, including GDP mis-
measurement, declining human and physical capital intensity, labour and capital hoarding, 
zombie firms, and austerity. In Section 4 I look at international evidence on the effects of 
banking crises on output per worker, capital per worker, total factor productivity (TFP), and 
output per capita, via a panel data study of 61 countries over 1950-2010. This enables one to 
quantify the permanent loss of GDP that is due to the crisis. However this model does not 
enable one to distinguish between the pessimistic and the very pessimistic scenarios (since 
the pessimistic scenario is the maintained hypothesis). I therefore turn in Section 5 to 
consider two case studies: the US in the aftermath of the Great Depression of the 1930s and 
Japan after the bubble burst in 1990 when it entered on its so-called “lost decade(s)”. As we 
shall see the US supports the case for the “pessimistic” scenario while Japan supports the 
case for the “very pessimistic” one. Section 6 concludes.  
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2 A pre-crisis projection of UK productivity growth6  
 
In this section I first make the general case for explicit consideration of ICT in making 
projections of future growth. Then I discuss the basic neo-classical (Solow) growth model 
and why it is deficient when ICT is important. I next set out a two-sector model in which the 
second sector produces ICT investment goods. Technical progress is assumed to be more 
rapid in the ICT sector. Finally I calibrate this model using pre-crisis data only.  
 
2.1 The importance of ICT 
 
The approach adopted here recognises the central importance of ICT in the modern world. 
After the growth rate of US labour productivity started to rise in the latter half of the 1990s, a 
number of highly influential growth accounting studies were published. These included 
Oliner and Sichel (2000) and (2002), Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000a) and (2000b), Stiroh 
(2002), Jorgenson, Ho and Stiroh (2004a, 2004b and 2007) and Oliner et al. (2007). These 
studies all attributed a high proportion of the productivity resurgence to ICT, and found that 
most of the improvement was due to the use of ICT equipment by other industries (capital 
deepening) rather than to the production of ICT equipment by the ICT industries themselves. 
See also (Oulton 2002), Oulton and Srinivasan (2005) and Marrano et al. (2009) for the UK, 
and for the G7 (Schreyer 2000); a US-UK comparison is Basu et al. (2004) and an EU-US 
comparison is van Ark, O’Mahony and Timmer (2008).  
  By their nature academic studies are always somewhat out of date, at least when they 
come to be published. So some more recent data is worth noting. Those who think that the 
ICT boom of the late 1990s was all irrational exuberance, a product of dotcom fever and Y2K 
hysteria, might like to note that in the US the net stock of computers was 111% higher in 
2007 than it had been in 2000, while the net stocks of software and communications 
equipment were 54% and 62% higher respectively (source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, 
Fixed Asset Tables, Table 2.2, available at www.bea.gov; accessed 11/02/2014).  
 
 
6   This section draws heavily on Oulton (2010) and (2012) where more detailed justification 
for some of the methods and assumptions can be found.  
Commented [n3]: This stuff is from the ICT & Growth project, 
though UK projection is new.  
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2.2 The textbook one–sector model 
 
I start with the textbook, one-sector (Solow) model, expanded to include human capital. 
Consideration of this model will motivate the move to a two-sector model. Here we assume 
just one sector whose output can be used for either consumption or investment. For simplicity 
and for consistency with the two-sector model below, I assume that the production function is 
Cobb-Douglas with constant returns. The equations of the model are:  
  (1) 
and  
  (2) 
where Y is output, C is consumption, I is investment,  is the level of total factor 
productivity (TFP), K is capital,  is hours worked,  is the average level of skill (human 
capital) per worker, and  is the geometric rate of decay (depreciation) of capital. Output per 
hour (y) is  
  (3) 
putting . TFP is assumed to grow at the exogenous rate μ, hours worked ( ) at the 
exogenous rate , and human capital (skill) at the exogenous rate .  
  As is well-known, under standard assumptions this model possesses a steady state in 
which output per hour grows at a constant rate given by:  
   (4) 
where a “hat” (^) denotes a growth rate and a star ( ) denotes the steady state. In the basic 
Solow model there is only one engine of growth, the exogenous growth of TFP (μ). Here 
there is also a second engine, the growth of human capital ( ). Physical capital plays an 
important role, but in the long run all capital deepening (growth of ) is induced by growth 
of TFP or growth of skill.7  
  In this model, forecasting the long run growth rate of hourly labour productivity (  is 
fairly straightforward: it requires just a forecast of TFP growth ( ), an estimate of the 
parameter  which corresponds to the capital (profit) share, and an estimate of the growth 
 
7   The derivation assumes a Cobb-Douglas production function but this is only for 
comparability with what follows. Essentially the same results could be derived from any neo-
classical production function with purely labour-augmenting technical progress.  
1[ ] , 0 1Y C I BK hH
K I K&
B
H h
1Yy Bh k
H
k K H H
n hg
ˆ
1 h
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rate of skill (h). Assuming that inputs are paid their marginal products, TFP growth can be 
measured by  
  (5) 
where  is the income share of capital (labour) and . (In terms of the model, 
). A forecast of TFP growth can be based on its own history, which 
empirically could be measured using a discrete-time Törnqvist index. A forecast of the 
growth of skill could also be based on its own past history.8  
  Where does ICT appear in the solution for the equilibrium growth rate, equation (4)? If 
we applied the model to an economy with some ICT production, then the fact that TFP 
growth has been (and will probably continue to be) higher in ICT than in non-ICT industries 
will influence the past and projected future aggregate TFP growth rate. But suppose instead 
we are considering a small, open economy with no ICT production at all (not an unrealistic 
assumption). Then the one-sector model predicts zero impact from the ICT revolution. But 
surely the ability to import ICT capital at ever-declining prices must be beneficial to growth? 
As we are about to see, this is exactly what the two-sector model predicts.  
 
2.3 A two–sector model9 
 
The one-sector model assumes in effect that there are no persistent changes in the relative 
prices of the myriad goods which make up a real economy. It thus fails to capture the most 
striking feature of recent economic history in the industrialised economies, namely the 
 
8   The growth of skill can be measured by the difference between a quality-adjusted index 
of the growth of hours and the unadjusted growth of hours. In the quality-adjusted index each 
type of labour is weighted by its wage. So quality is rising if the composition of the labour 
force is shifting towards more highly paid forms of work. For UK measures of skill growth, 
see Bell et al. (2005); similar measures appear in the EU KLEMS database. The ONS also 
now produces a similar measure (Franklin and Mistry 2013).  
9  The present model draws on Oulton (2007) and (2012). A model similar in structure to the 
present one but with a quite different interpretation is in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995), 
chapter 5. The two-sector model with faster technical progress in investment goods was 
revived by Whelan (2001) and applied by Martin (2001) to study the US economy and by 
Cette et al. (2005) to compare France and the US. It was also employed by Bakhshi and 
Larsen (2005) to analyse the impact of macroeconomic shocks in the UK context. Oliner and 
Sichel (2002) employ the steady state of a five-sector model for some of their projections of 
the US economy. The main difference between the earlier work and the present application is 
the extension of the two-sector model to an open economy.  
ˆˆ
K L L
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dramatic and persistent falls in the relative price of ICT investment goods. For example, in 
the United States between 1970 and 2007 the relative price of computers in terms of the price 
of output in the non-farm business sector was falling at an average rate of 20.32% per year; 
the relative price of the broader category of “information processing equipment and software” 
was falling at 8.12% per year (source: U.S. National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA); 
see Chart 5). This rate of decline, sustained over four decades and more, is unprecedented. So 
I now consider a two-sector model in which the relative price of the good produced by the 
second sector is changing.  
  I assume that the output of the first sector can be used either for consumption (  or for 
investment ( ; the output of the second sector, which we can think of as the sector 
producing ICT goods, can only be used for investment ( . For brevity, I refer to the 
sector producing consumption and non-ICT investment goods as just the consumption sector. 
The production function for this sector is given by  
  (6) 
where   are capital services of non-ICT and ICT capital respectively that are used 
by the consumption sector (here the superscript represents the industry), and  is hours 
worked in that sector. In per hour terms,  
  (7) 
Here  and , the capital intensities in the consumption sector. I assume as 
before that skill is growing exogenously at rate  and that TFP in the consumption good 
sector ( ) is growing at rate .  
  For the ICT-producing sector, I make a crucial, simplifying assumption: the production 
function is the same as in the consumption sector, except for TFP. As a result, in equilibrium 
the capital intensities will be the same in both sectors and equal to the whole-economy input 
endowments. The production function for the ICT sector is:  
  (8) 
Here  and , the capital intensities. The growth rate of TFP in the ICT 
sector, , is assumed exogenous. I also assume that .  
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  The model is completed by equations stating that input supplies must equal demands, by 
two accumulation equations for the two types of capital, and two balance equations stating 
that the supply (domestic output plus imports) of each industry’s output must equal demand 
(home plus foreign). It is also useful to define the price of ICT goods relative to that of 
consumption goods, :  where  are the nominal prices of the ICT and 
consumer goods respectively.  
  Oulton (2012) shows that the model possesses a steady state (defined as a state where the 
real interest rate and the proportion of aggregate hours allocated to each sector are constant) 
with the following properties. The growth rate of consumption per hour worked ( ) 
is constant in the steady state:  
  (9) 
It can also be shown that  
  (10) 
since by assumption . So the steady state growth rate can also be written as:  
  (11) 
This second form of the solution is useful in empirical work.  
  To complete the solution of the model, the steady state growth rates of output per hour in 
the two sectors are:  
  (12) 
We see that in steady state output and productivity of the consumption good grow less rapidly 
than does output and productivity of the ICT good. It can also be shown:  (1) the stock of 
ICT capital grows faster than the stock of non-ICT capital; and (2) the ratios of investment to 
GDP, the capital-output ratios and the savings ratio, all in value (current price) terms, are 
constant in the steady state.  
  Intuitively, where there were two engines of growth in the one-sector model, TFP and 
skills growth, there is now a third, TFP growth in the ICT sector which is faster than in the 
consumption sector. This third engine drives up the growth rate of consumption permanently.  
  A Divisia index of the steady state growth rate of real GDP per hour (y) can now be 
derived as:  
p ICT Cp P P ,ICTP CP
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  (13) 
where  is the steady state output share of the ICT sector. The 
growth rate of GDP per hour is obviously positively related to the two TFP growth rates. It is 
also positively related to (a) the parameter  which can be interpreted as the income share of 
ICT capital and (b) the share of ICT output in GDP ( ). It is easy to see that real GDP 
grows more rapidly than real consumption in the steady state if the ICT output share is 
positive (i.e. if ). Note that the solution to the two-sector model, equation (13), 
reduces to that of the one-sector model, equation (4), if , i.e. if TFP growth is the same 
in both sectors (and noting that in this case ).  
  The solution just given applies just as much to an open as to a closed economy. It shows 
how misleading the one-sector model can be. For that model predicts that the long run growth 
rate of a small economy which is completely specialised in the non-ICT good is determined 
entirely by TFP growth in that sector (and the labour share and the growth of skill). So such 
an economy apparently derives no benefit at all from the ICT revolution. But we now see that 
it does benefit in the form of improving terms of trade and the two-sector model allows us to 
quantify this effect. If the ICT output share is zero ( ), then the boost to growth 
coming from the fact that technical progress is faster in ICT is .  
 
2.4 Implementing	the	two-sector	model	empirically	
 
The empirical counterpart of the theoretical equation (13), describing the steady state growth 
of GDP per hour, can be written as follows:  
  (14) 
where bars over variables indicate projected values;  is the projected income share of 
ICT capital,  is the projected income share of labour,  is the projected output share of 
the ICT sector, and  is the projected growth rate of skill. Values for these parameters are 
required for medium/long run projections of GDP growth.  
*
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  Annual data for the UK for the income and output shares of ICT, the labour share, the 
growth of skill, and overall TFP growth10 can be found in the EU KLEMS database, for the 
years 1970-2007.11 The growth rate of the relative price of ICT is taken from the US NIPA. 
Most researchers who study the impact of ICT consider the US price indices to be more 
reliable than their counterparts in other countries (Schreyer (2002), Oulton (2001); 
O’Mahony and van Ark (2003); Oulton and Srinivasan (2005)).12 I follow suit here and 
measure the relative price of ICT as the US price of ICT equipment (computers, software and 
communications equipment) relative to the price of gross value added in the non-farm 
business sector (the latter being close to the EU KLEMS market sector).  
  All these series (in log levels for TFP and the ICT relative price, in levels for the shares) 
were passed through a Hodrick-Prescott filter. I have used two methods to pick parameter 
values, depending on the nature of the time series. In the case of series which appear 
stationary like the labour share I use the mean over 1990-2007. In other cases I use the value 
of the HP trend of that variable (or its growth rate) in 2007. The parameter values I adopted 
are in Table 2. The value for , the projected rate of decline of the ICT relative price, is 
quite a conservative one. It is (numerically) smaller than its mean value over 1990-2007 
(minus 8.12%) since the HP trend picks up an apparent deceleration after 2000 (Chart 5). 
Plugging the parameter values in the table into equation (14), the growth rate of the UK’s 
GDP per hour in the market sector is projected to be 0.0261 or 2.61% p.a. The extra boost to 
growth coming from the falling price of ICT is estimated as  
  (15) 
or 0.52% p.a., i.e. about a fifth of future growth is projected to come from the falling price of 
ICT. The projected growth rate is slower than the rate actually achieved over 1990-2007, 
2.87% (see Chart 4) mainly because of the assumption that ICT prices will fall more slowly 
 
10  Given an estimate of overall TFP growth, say , we can apply Domar aggregation to 
obtain .  
11  In EU KLEMS the income share of an ICT asset is measured by standard growth 
accounting techniques. It is the rental price (user cost) of the asset times the stock divided by 
nominal GDP in the market sector; the rental price is the Hall-Jorgenson measure. The output 
share of ICT is nominal value added in ICT-producing industries divided by nominal GDP in 
the market sector.  
12  In the UK the Office for National Statistics now employs a similar methodology to that of 
the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis to measure the price of computers, but this new 
methodology has only been applied to recent years of the computer price series. So the UK 
series moves in a similar way to the US one in recent but not in earlier years.  
ln p
ln
0.0052ICTK
L
v p
v
lnB
ln ln lnC ICTB B w p
Commented [NO4]: Estimates in table from aust.xls. Originally 
estimated in uk.do and usictpriuces.do. HP trend for output share 
calculated by hand from UK data in all_data.dta.  
16 
 
in future. If to the contrary they continue to fall at the average rate actually observed over 
1990-2007 (8.12% p.a.) then the projected growth rate would rise to 2.79% p.a. with the ICT 
contribution rising to 0.71% p.a.  
  It is also worth noting that the projected growth rate generated by the one-sector model is 
much lower. The mean TFP growth rate in the UK market sector was 1.14% p.a. over 1990-
2007. Applying equation (4) generates a projected growth rate of only 2.13%. This is much 
slower than the actual rate experienced over 1990-2007 (2.87% p.a.); see also Oulton (2010), 
Annex B. Recall that all these calculations are based on pre-crisis data.  
  ICT has been an important source of growth for the UK since the UK has been an early 
adopter of the new technologies. Out of 19 leading economies the ICT income share was 
higher in the UK than in 15 of the others, being surpassed only by the US and the Swedish 
shares (Oulton 2012, Table 3). Cette and Lopez (2008) found that across countries the ICT 
income share varies positively with the extent of higher education and negatively with 
product and labour market rigidities. It is likely therefore that the high UK share reflects our 
advantages on these dimensions.  
 
 
3 Labour productivity during and after the Great Recession: puzzles and 
explanations  
 
This section reviews the course of labour productivity in the United Kingdom in and after the 
Great Recession. I consider first some puzzling facts and then turn to possible explanations.  
 
3.1 Puzzles 
 
GDP started falling in 2008Q2 and continued falling in the subsequent six quarters up to and 
including 2009Q3. It began rising again in 2009Q4 (Table 1). 2009Q3 therefore marks the 
trough of the present cycle while 2009Q4 marks the end of the recession in a technical sense 
and the start of the recovery (Source: Quarterly National Accounts, June 2013). Relative to 
its peak in 2008Q1 to the trough of the recession, labour productivity (GDP per hour) fell by 
4.5% (Table 4). Comparing the latest period, 2013Q1, with the previous peak, labour 
productivity was lower still, by 5.1%. And relative to the pre-crisis HP trend, labour 
Commented [n5]:  Descriptive stuff mainly from Productivity & 
QNA\Productivity\June-July-2013\programs  and Productivity & 
QNA\QNA\June-2013\programs.  
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productivity in 2013Q1 was 16% lower. So relative to the peak labour productivity fell in the 
recession and has since stagnated. This is the productivity puzzle.  
  Labour productivity on a “heads” basis, GDP per job, looks even worse than on an hours 
basis, at least up till the last three quarters (Table 1). This is because hours fell more than did 
jobs, an interesting example of the UK’s labour market flexibility. Weekly hours per job were 
declining prior to the recession. But they fell below their previous trend during the recession, 
though they are now back to their pre-recession level (Table 1).  
  The UK experience is in sharp contrast to that of the United States. There output per hour 
in the nonfarm business sector fell initially as the recession began but then recovered 
strongly. In 2009Q1 it surpassed its previous peak level of 2007Q4. Though growth slowed in 
2012, by 2013Q4 productivity was 10% higher than the previous peak. On average it grew by 
1.9% per year between 2007 and 2011. By comparison productivity grew at 2.6% over 2000-
2007 and 2.2% over 1990-2001.13 So there has been a slowdown but no crisis in US labour 
productivity, despite the fact that during the recession GDP fell by about the same proportion 
in the US as in the UK. The UK productivity performance post-recession also seems to have 
been worse than in most EU countries (Hughes and Saleheen 2012).  
 
3.2 Aggregate	and	sectoral	analysis	
 
Further insight into the productivity puzzle comes from breaking down the economy firstly 
into broad aggregates and secondly more finely by sector (see Table 3).  
 
The	influence	of	hard-to-measure	or	otherwise	problematic	sectors		
Initially I check whether the overall picture is changed by looking at broad sectors such as the 
market economy, i.e. GDP excluding government services (Public administration and 
defence, Education, and Health and social services, sectors O, P and Q), which was 74.1% of 
GDP in 2010. Next I also exclude sectors which are problematic in various ways. There are 
some sectors where labour productivity was declining prior to the recession and other sectors 
whose performance cannot be taken at face value (see below). Some of these problematic 
sectors are natural-resource-dependent, such as Agriculture (A) and oil and gas (B), in others 
 
13  Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics, www.bls.gov.lpc/prodybar.htm, accessed 
11/02/2014.  
Commented [46]: Source: prod1.do 
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there may be measurement issues, e.g. Financial and insurance activities (K). 14 It is often 
suggested that banking output was overstated in the boom (more on this below). I also 
exclude the imputed rent of owner-occupiers from Real estate (L) since there are no hours 
worked associated to this form of output. The resulting aggregate (MEX) was 61.6% of GDP 
in 2010. Market services (MS) is the market economy with the production sector and utilities 
(A-F) excluded, 51.9% of GDP in 2010. I calculate real gross value added (GVA) in these 
broad aggregates using the ONS methodology (annually chain-linked Laspeyres indices).  
  Productivity performance is shown in Table 4. Column 1 shows the official figures for 
labour productivity, GDP (at basic prices) per hour. Column 3 shows the market economy 
(ME) and columns 4 shows the MEX aggregate. There is very little difference between the 
performance of these aggregates, though MEX has perhaps done a shade better since the 
trough.  
  Chart 6 shows the course of quarterly labour productivity (GDP per hour worked) in these 
aggregates from 1997Q1 up till the latest date available at the time of writing, 2013Q1. These 
and the following charts have a common format. What actually happened (according to the 
most recent information) is shown as a solid line with a dashed line showing the trend 
estimated over the pre-recession period. The trend is calculated by the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) 
filter (with parameter set to 1600 since these are quarterly data) over the pre-crisis period 
1997Q1-2008Q1 and extrapolated beyond then to the end of the period (2013Q1). The 
vertical axis is on a log scale so that growth rates can be read off from the slopes of the lines. 
The charts also show the Great Recession (the period of falling GDP, 2008Q2-2009Q3) 
marked by a red bar. Chart 6 confirms the evidence of Table 4: excluding sectors which may 
be problematic for various reasons does not resolve the productivity puzzle. Productivity fell 
in each of these aggregates and has yet to regain its previous peak.  
 
Reallocation	of	labour	to	sectors	where	productivity	is	lower		
Has the aggregate productivity performance been materially affected by resources shifting 
from high productivity sectors to low productivity ones? Table 3 shows a breakdown into 17 
sectors. This table shows the share of each sector’s value added in aggregate value added 
(GDP) in the last year of the boom, 2007. Also shown are the 2007 shares of each sector in 
aggregate hours worked. If we divide the share in GDP by the share in aggregate hours we 
 
14 See Burgess (2011) and Oulton (2013) for discussion of the problems in measuring the 
output of financial services.  
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get the relative labour productivity of each sector (value added per hour in each sector 
divided by aggregate value added (GDP) per hour); this is shown in the last column. The 
level of labour productivity varies widely across the 17 sectors, from a low of 0.39 in 
“Agriculture, forestry & fishing” to a high of 10.65 in “Mining and quarrying including oil 
and gas”. So, hypothetically, holding the productivity growth rate in each sector at its 
observed value but reallocating labour towards (say) a sector with a low productivity level 
could lower aggregate productivity by a significant amount.  
  We can see whether this actually happened by calculating what GDP per hour would have 
been if productivity had risen in each sector at the rate actually observed but the allocation of 
labour across the sectors was the same as in 2007, i.e. the 2007 labour shares continued 
unchanged at their Table 3 values. The result is in column (4) of Table 4: holding labour 
shares constant makes virtually no difference (a conclusion already reached by Martin 
(2011)).  
  Despite this negative result, a shift away from high productivity to low productivity 
activities within (rather than between) sectors might have further explanatory power. Suppose 
that in the recession shoppers shift from high margin to low margin stores. The high margin 
stores offer a better shopping experience or better service but their prices for comparable 
products are higher (think of buying bananas in Harrods Food Hall compared to in your local 
Tesco). This shift would show up as a fall in output and productivity in the official statistics.  
The same effect could arise if there is a shift towards cheaper, own-brand products within a 
given store. 15  
 
The	productivity	puzzle	at	the	sectoral	level	
Chart 7 shows the course of labour productivity in each of the 17 sectors of Table 3.16 More 
recent data has substantially changed the picture formed on the basis of earlier evidence. 
Patterns which were discernible in data released in mid-2012 are now not so apparent (Oulton 
and Sebastiá-Barriel 2013). The general conclusion from looking at these charts is that the 
 
15 Philip Clarke, Tesco chief executive, argues such a shift has indeed taken place since the 
recession began (“Lessons from the supermarket for austerity Britain”, Financial Times, 19 
October 2012).  
16  These data can be found (with considerable difficulty) on the ONS website at 
http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/about-ons/what-we-do/publication-scheme/published-ad-hoc-
data/economy/index.html. I have used the spreadsheet dated June-July 2013. Note that total 
hours worked are derived from the Labour Force Survey (LFS), as is self-employment, and 
hours worked in each sector are scaled so that they add up to the LFS total.  
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productivity puzzle is very widespread. Most sectors now fall into the “very pessimistic” 
category, including Manufacturing (C), Wholesale and retail trade (G), and Finance and 
insurance activities (K). Previously government services (O,P,Q) looked to have performed 
quite well but now they seem just as subject to the productivity puzzle as other sectors. 
Information and communication (J) now also appears to be in the “very pessimistic” 
category. There are some maverick sectors. Productivity growth in Construction (F) is very 
erratic but the trend was declining prior to the recession. The more recent data puts this sector 
right on its falling trend. In the utilities too (D and E) trend productivity was declining prior 
to the recession and actual performance has worsened since. Presumably regulation (e.g. the 
cost of meeting higher environmental standards) has played a role here. Other sectors on a 
declining trend before the recession were Agriculture (A), and Oil and gas (B). The latter has 
done particularly poorly since then. Presumably geology is the main explanation. Finally, 
Real estate (L) is a particular puzzle. Before the recession productivity was declining but 
after the recession it rises sharply, and this despite the fact that we have stripped out the 
imputed rent of owner-occupiers.  
 
3.3 Mis-measurement	of	GDP	due	to	mis-measurement	of	banking	output 
 
It is frequently argued that the output of the banking industry was overstated during the 
boom. Bankers were selling financial products of low or no social value (“toxic rubbish”) to 
ignorant or greedy clients. So if banking output were measured correctly it would be seen to 
have grown more slowly than the official figures suggest. Consequently, since banking is a 
large industry in the UK, the growth of real GDP must have been overstated too. If this 
argument is correct, it would have serious consequences, not just for our view of the recent 
past but also for our view of the likely future. For if British growth in the run-up to the crisis 
was slower than we originally thought, then our view of the likely future path of GDP should 
be correspondingly more pessimistic, even when the economy has fully recovered from the 
Great Recession. Equally, if GDP in the boom was overstated, but is more accurately 
measured now, then some of the sting from the productivity puzzle will have been removed.  
  Elsewhere I have argued that this argument is wrong (Oulton 2013a). Even if the premise 
is correct (“Banking output has been overstated”), the conclusion (“GDP growth has been 
overstated”) does not follow. The error in the argument derives from a failure to understand 
how the ONS actually constructs its estimates of real GDP. Closer to the truth would be the 
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assertion: “if banking output has been overstated, then the output of some other industry or 
industries must have been understated”. Briefly, the reason why the argument is wrong is that 
the Office for National Statistics measures the real growth of GDP primarily from the 
expenditure side (GDP(E)). And from the expenditure side most of the problematic part of 
banking output drops out since this part is intermediate consumption rather than final 
expenditure. For example, any financial product sold to a domestic business is intermediate 
consumption and the services generated by selling mortgages to owner-occupiers are also 
intermediate (they show up as a cost of producing the implicit rent of owner-occupiers).  
  The ONS also measures the growth of real GDP from the output side (GDP(O)). But the 
output side estimate is “reconciled” with the expenditure side one by adjusting the growth 
rate of some industries (including banking) till the two estimates are equal (within narrow 
limits). I calculated that any overstatement of GDP growth due to errors in measuring final 
expenditure on banking services is not likely to have exceeded 0.1% p.a. over 2000-2007.  
 
3.4 Overheating	in	the	boom?		
 
Suppose that in the boom the economy was operating at a progressively higher level of 
demand pressure. In other words, productivity was growing faster than its true trend rate. 
Then the fall in productivity experienced after the boom ended would exaggerate the true 
decline or even conceivably eliminate it altogether. Chart 8 gathers together four indicators of 
demand pressure. From the expenditure side there is the growth of the GDP deflator (at basic 
prices) and the ratio of net exports to GDP (in current prices). From the labour market side 
there is the unemployment rate and the employment rate of those aged 16-64.17  
  None of these indicators show any sign of trending upwards over the period 2000Q1 to 
2008Q1. True, the unemployment rate fell, and the employment rate rose, over 2000-2002 
but after that they stabilised. The net export ratio also fell between 2000 and 2002 but it too 
stabilised. Given that inflation was low and showed no sign of accelerating over this period 
(which was after all part of the “Great Moderation”), there is no evidence of excessive 
pressure of demand, still less of growing pressure.  
 
17  Sources: GDP deflator at basic prices [ABML/ABMM and net exports (exports minus 
imports) as a proportion of GDP at market prices [IKBJ/YBHA] from Quarterly National 
Accounts June 2013; unemployment rate [MGSX] and employment rate [LF24] from Labour 
Force Statistics, July 2013.  
 
22 
 
 
3.5 Lower physical capital input?  
 
One possible explanation for lower labour productivity is a decline in capital services per unit 
of labour (“capital shallowing”), due to lower investment since the Great Recession began. 
The UK labour market is now exceptionally flexible. In the face of a massive demand shock, 
real wages have fallen by about 4% (Table 6) while the cost of capital has risen. This has led 
firms to reduce the quantity of capital per hour worked. Consequently output per hour, i.e. 
productivity, has fallen (Pessoa and Van Reenen 2013). This is a seductive story but is it 
true? Business investment has of course fallen massively since the Great Recession began. 
But a fall in investment does not necessarily imply a fall in the capital stock, still less a fall in 
capital per hour worked.  
  The ONS has recently published estimates of TFP which go up to 2012 (Field and 
Franklin 2012). They find that capital deepening in the whole economy was positive in each 
of the years 2008 to 2011 though it was negative in 2012. But the level in 2012 was still 3% 
higher than in 2007. So there has been capital deepening during and after the recession, not 
capital shallowing. Estimates for the market sector by Goodridge et al. (2012) also show no 
capital shallowing up to 2009 (their latest year).  
  Because of the importance of this issue, and because the ONS has massively revised its 
investment series, I have made some estimates of my own, employing both the old and the 
new series. I use business investment, which is arguably more appropriate for productivity 
analysis, with a range of assumptions about depreciation. I use the Perpetual Inventory 
Method (PIM) and the standard capital accumulation equation:  
   
Here K is capital, I is gross investment and d is the depreciation rate. My measure of capital 
deepening is the growth of capital per hour worked in the market sector.  
  A quarterly ONS series on real investment in the business sector (chained volume 
measure; ONS code NPEL) is available from 1987 up till the present. A perpetual inventory 
calculation requires an initial capital stock which in this case is lacking. So to start with I 
assume an initial stock of zero at the beginning of 1987: this is the first round. This already 
produces estimates of the stock in later years which are not too bad (given the other 
assumptions): at an 8% annual depreciation rate any initial stock has decayed to only about 
12% of its 1987 level by the end of the period 25 years later. But we can do better. I take the 
1(1 )t t tK d K I
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capital-investment ratio at the end of the period as estimated by the first round and assume 
that it applies at the beginning of the period too. This generates a better estimate of the initial 
stock. The process can be repeated. After the third round the growth rates of capital do not 
change much. My estimates from the third round appear in Table 5. Looking first at the left 
hand panel, my preferred results use an annual depreciation rate of 8% (2.063% quarterly, the 
first column) but I also show results for 6% and 10% annual rates (columns 2 and 3).  
  It turns out that the growth rates of capital are not very sensitive to the assumed 
depreciation rate in the period of the Great Recession and its aftermath (2008Q2 onwards, 
though the peak for capital per hour was in 2007Q4). The growth rate of capital has been 
positive in every quarter from 2008Q1 to 2012Q4 though only half as fast as in the boom 
period.  
  Hours initially fell but have been generally rising since 2010Q2. As a result, there have 
been quarters when capital deepening was negative, particularly from 2011Q3 to 2102Q3. 
Nonetheless, the broad trend is upward: assuming an 8% annual depreciation rate, capital per 
hour had in 2010Q3 increased by 9% relative to the pre-recession peak (see Table 5). Since 
then capital per hour has been declining. But the level in 2012Q4 was still 7% above the pre-
recession peak in 2007Q4.  
  These estimates use what I call the “old series” for business investment. In July the ONS 
released what I call the “new series” which it claims to be an improvement mainly due to 
more disaggregated deflation of nominal investment in different assets. The new series differs 
in many respects from the old and some of these differences seem highly implausible (and 
unexplained): the new series is much more volatile and has a much flatter HP trend over the 
run-up to the recession. So it would not be surprising if the new series were eventually 
revised. However that may be, the right hand panel of Table 5, derived from the new series, 
shows a very similar picture to the left hand one: there is no evidence of capital shallowing.  
  These calculations show that far from falling, capital per hour has been rising since the 
recession began. On my preferred depreciation measure (8% p.a.), in 2012Q4 it was 7% 
above the pre-recession peak of 2007Q4, using the old series, and 4% higher using the new 
series.18  
  These calculations employ the concept of investment laid down in the current System of 
National Accounts under which some types of intangible investment such as software are 
 
18  I therefore disagree with the conclusion of Pessoa and Van Reenen (2013) that capital 
shallowing has occurred: see Oulton (2013) for more detail.  
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included but some such as R&D are excluded. Goodridge et al. (2013) argue that intangible 
investment is part of the explanation of the productivity puzzle. Intangible investment, 
particularly expenditure on R&D, has held up well during and after the recession. So if R&D 
is included in GDP as a form of investment (as it will be when the new System of National 
Accounts is implemented), GDP will be seen to have fallen by less than on the current 
official estimate; they estimate that GDP in the market sector would have been 1.6% higher 
in 2012.19  
 
3.6 Lower human capital (skill)?  
 
Falling labour productivity might be explained by falling labour quality. Unfortunately for 
this explanation, labour quality has increased steadily increased since 2007. It was 5% higher 
at the end of 2012 than in 2007. This is not very surprising since in a downturn less skilled 
workers are more likely to lose their jobs. So far from helping to explain it, this deepens the 
productivity puzzle (Franklin and Mistry, 2013).  
 
3.7 Labour/capital hoarding? 
 
That output per hour should fall during a recession is not surprising. This is in fact the normal 
experience. One common explanation is labour hoarding: firms tend to hang on to labour 
during a downturn to avoid firing costs and then hiring costs during the subsequent upturn. 
An alternative explanation is that some labour has an overhead character, for example the 
security guards looking after a building (as long as the building continues in use and is not 
sold, abandoned or demolished). What is puzzling in the British case is that six years after the 
onset of the recession labour productivity is still below its previous peak and well below its 
previous trend. Certainly output too is below its previous trend but why have firms not 
adjusted to this by reducing labour input (either hours or jobs)? If potential labour 
productivity has been growing at something like the pre-crisis rate, it is hard to understand 
why firms should want to hang on to labour. In fact, jobs in the market sector have been 
 
19  They also argue that intangible investment, particularly in R&D, generates positive 
externalities. Intangible investment slowed down in the early 2000s and this could have led to 
a slowing of TFP growth after the boom. These two effects together could account, they 
argue, for about a third of the 16% percentage point fall in labour productivity relative to 
trend in 2012. 
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increasing since 2010Q1. And evidence from business surveys (reviewed by Dale (2011)) 
suggests that there is little spare capacity.  
  The case for labour hoarding has been forcefully argued by Martin and Rowthorn (2012). 
Their argument mainly rests on the importance of overhead labour. They also point out that 
both human and physical capital per worker have increased during the recession (see above), 
so on these grounds we would expect labour productivity to have risen not fallen. They also 
argue that the alternative, damage hypothesis is inherently implausible: why should 
disruption in the banking sector lead to loss of knowledge of how to produce output in the 
rest of the economy? (I return to this issue below).  
  The cost of making a worker redundant in the United Kingdom is quite substantial, about 
£12,000 or slightly less than half the average annual wage according to the CBI (cited in 
Faccini and Hackworth (2010)). So this could easily explain why firms are reluctant to fire 
workers at the beginning of a recession, especially if they expect to have to rehire the same or 
similar workers in about a year’s time. But six years after the recession began this 
explanation looks increasingly thin. According to Faccini and Hackworth (2010) again, 
employment protection legislation (EPL) has not changed much since the mid-1980s on the 
OECD’s measure, though it may now possibly be enforced more rigorously. They also find 
two other factors which go the other way. First, the flexibility of real wages has increased 
since 1993 (partly due to the decline in unionisation), which has helped to maintain 
employment in the downturn. Between 2008Q1 and 2013Q1 real producer wages fell by 
4.4%; in the private sector they fell by 6.6% (Table 6). Second, the costs of hiring may have 
increased since the average skill level of the workforce is now higher than in previous 
recessions; this would make firms more reluctant to fire workers in the downturn.  
  Given the length of the productivity downturn the labour hoarding hypothesis must rely 
on firms retaining labour because of its overhead character. But (to use the earlier example) a 
building, say a shop, may require a security guard but at some point it is cheaper to sack the 
guard and close the shop down rather than keep it in operation in anticipation of an upturn in 
sales.  
  Capital rather than labour hoarding i.e. lower capital utilisation, may be a more plausible 
mechanism. Consider a firm which runs a chain of shops. Though previously in profit, the 
firm is running at a loss after the recession hits. So it closes one or more of its stores, which 
raises footfall in its surviving stores and restores the firm to profit. If real wages fall it might 
be worthwhile for the firm to increase employment in its surviving stores since competition 
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may be more intense in the new environment, i.e. effective (utilised) capital per unit of labour 
could fall.  
  What about the stores which are standing empty? At some point the firm will want to sell 
these if sales do not revive. But selling them right away might be difficult if all retail firms 
are facing the same difficulties. And transferring them to other uses may be costly and time-
consuming in a country like Britain where planning permission would be required. 
Demolishing the stores is unlikely to be a more profitable (or legal) option than just leaving 
them standing empty.  
  This story of falling effective capital per unit of labour is compatible with rising actual 
capital per unit of labour. So a typical PIM calculation would still give the correct answer 
(since the boarded-up shops still exist) but does not take into account the fall in utilisation. 
The story is potentially applicable outside retailing, e.g. to manufacturing: the mothballing  of 
plants or production lines could lead to a similar result. In summary, in this story labour is 
fully utilised but capital is not. Capital is not fully utilised because it takes time to dispose of 
or to convert to some new use.  
 
3.8 Crippled	banks	and	zombie	firms?	
 
There is considerable anecdotal evidence of apparently sound firms being denied credit on 
reasonable terms after the banking crisis began. Banks were trying to repair their balance 
sheets and this was at the expense of their business customers (as well as of potential home 
owners). The opposite accusation is also often made: banks have exercised forbearance, i.e. 
they have rolled over loans to insolvent businesses, or forgiven interest payments, because 
they were unwilling to recognise the losses on their balance sheets. Certainly the number of 
insolvencies has been surprisingly low given the depth of the recession.  
  The denial of credit to sound firms presumably affects small and medium sized 
enterprises (SMEs) more than large ones since the latter have access to stock market finance, 
which is available now at very low interest rates; in any case the corporate sector as a whole 
is in financial surplus and holds very large cash balances. Denial of credit has to show up 
somewhere. It may be part of the reason why business investment has fallen. If so, we have 
already taken it into account in the discussion of capital input above. It might show up in 
other ways. One possibility is that firms economise on working capital and this could lead to 
lower productivity; for example a manufacturing firm might hold fewer spare parts and this 
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would lead to more down time and so to lower labour productivity. But inventory-sales ratios 
do not seem to have fallen since the recession began. Another way that firms could 
economise on finance is by employing fewer people. But here the evidence goes the other 
way. It is SMEs who have been less willing to shed labour than larger firms who are 
presumably less affected by credit constraints.  
  The zombie firms story bring an element of déjà vu to those of us who remember the 
controversies surrounding the 1980-81 recession. Then it was often claimed that the apparent 
productivity improvement in manufacturing was due to a “batting average” effect: the 
elimination of the lowest productivity firms through bankruptcy (for cricket fans, this is like 
not allowing the tail-enders to bat which raises the average but not the total score). The 
zombie firms claim is the batting average argument in reverse: now it is supposedly the least 
productive firms who survive through forbearance by the banks, so dragging down the 
average productivity level. But when the economy is still in a slump, loss-making firms are 
not necessarily the same as low productivity firms. In principle this question could be settled 
through microdata analysis.20 At the time of writing, this analysis has yet to be done. For the 
moment I am sceptical that zombies can account for a large part of the productivity puzzle.  
 
3.9 Austerity  
 
The picture painted by numerous bloggers and commentators is that the UK has been passing 
through a period of unparalleled austerity (“the cuts”). If this picture is correct, then austerity 
by depressing aggregate demand must be a candidate explanation for the productivity puzzle. 
There is considerable debate on the size of the fiscal multiplier with many asserting that it is 
particularly large when (as now) the economy is at or close to the zero lower bound (ZLB). In 
Oulton (2013b) I argued that neither on theoretical nor empirical grounds is the evidence on 
the effectiveness of fiscal policy quite as clear cut as many claim. But whatever we conclude 
on these issues, before we can estimate the impact of austerity on GDP, we need to know 
how large the cuts have been. Prior to examining this, let’s first note that whatever may have 
been the case for fiscal policy, monetary and financial policy have been extremely 
supportive. First, UK banks were supported by a huge bailout and two of the largest (RBS 
 
20  Microdata analysis eventually settled the issues around the 1980-81 recession. A large 
part of the productivity improvement was due to productivity growth in surviving firms 
(Oulton 2000; Disney et al. 2003).  
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and Lloyds-HBOS) were effectively nationalised. Second, Bank Rate was cut. It was 5.75% 
in November 2007. By April 2008 it had been cut in three steps to 5%, a level maintained till 
October 2008. From then on it was rapidly reduced till it reached 0.5% in March 2009 where 
it has remained up till now (February 2014). Third, the exchange rate fell abruptly. The 
sterling exchange rate index (ERI) stood at a peak of 104.6 in 2007Q1. The low point was 
reached in 2009Q1 at 77.8, a fall of 26%. It has risen a little since then but still stood at 80.5 
in 2013Q1, a fall of 23% from the peak. Though not explicitly the result of policy (no 
currency manipulation here!), the depreciation was certainly allowed by and a result of our 
monetary framework. Fourth, once Bank Rate reached virtually the ZLB the policy of 
quantitative easing was wheeled out under which the Bank of England has acquired 29% of 
the stock of gilts with the possibility of more to come if the MPC were to so decide. Fifth, 
there have been various programmes to encourage bank lending to business such as the 
Funding for Lending Scheme.  
 
Public	sector	employment	and	expenditure		
One measure of austerity is jobs in the public sector. Between March 2008 when the boom 
ended and December 2012 the number of public sector workers fell by 288,000 or by 4.8%. 
Taking account of transfers into and out of the public sector (i.e. reclassifications) increases 
the fall to 6.5%.21 By itself this represents a fall of 1.3% in total employment. But over the 
same period total employment actually rose by 0.7%, i.e. gains in the private sector more than 
compensated for losses in the public sector.  
  However, because of changes in the degree of outsourcing of activities in the public 
sector, the number of jobs may not be a very good measure of the government’s impact on 
the economy. So it is better to look at government spending on goods and services, both 
current and capital. Columns 1-3 of Table 7 show real government (central plus local) 
expenditure on goods and services, capital, current and total, using the official (ONS) 
concepts.22 Real government current spending has been higher in every quarter since the 
 
21 Source: Office for National Statistics, a spreadsheet available online as 
emp02mar2013_tcm77-301480.xls. Employees in Lloyds-HBOS and Royal Bank of Scotland 
were transferred from the private to the public sector in October 2008. 196,000 employees in 
Further Education Corporations and Sixth Form Colleges Corporations were transferred from 
the public to the private sector between March and June 2012.  
22  Total real government expenditure on goods and services is not published by the ONS. I 
have calculated it as an annually-chained Laspeyres index of current and capital spending. In 
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recession began than it was at the peak (2008Q1). Real government investment has followed 
an erratic course since the recession began. It mainly rose in the last two years of the Labour 
government and has mainly been lower after the coalition came to power in Spring 2010. But 
its average level has been about the same as in 2008Q1. Investment is much smaller than 
current spending. So total expenditure has unambiguously risen since the peak: in 2013Q1 
total government expenditure was 6% higher than in 2008Q1. In other words, far from 
austerity we have had a fiscal stimulus.  
  We can measure the contribution of government expenditure to growth as the government 
share (in nominal terms) times the growth rate of real expenditure. The government’s 
contribution since the recession has on average been positive, at 0.09 percentage points per 
quarter.  
  It might be objected that the official measures of real government spending are 
misleading since they incorporate many disputable assumptions about how to measure 
productivity in the public sector. So I have calculated two alternative, “Keynesian” measures. 
The idea here is to forget about the social value of government expenditure (the education of 
children, the care of the sick, etc) and just consider it as an engine for pumping effective 
demand into the economy. In the first Keynesian measure nominal government expenditure is 
deflated by the GDP deflator (column 4). Done in this way, government expenditure is higher 
than at the peak up till 2011Q1 before falling back. In 2013Q1 it was 2% lower than at the 
peak. From 2008Q2 to 2013Q1 its average level was 100.5. For the second Keynesian 
measure I take a leaf from the master’s book and measure volumes in wage units, i.e. by 
deflating nominal values by a wage index, as recommended by Keynes in the General Theory 
(Keynes 1936 [1961], page 41). Using the Average Weekly Earnings index as the deflator, 
the results of this alternative calculation appear in column 5. Again we find that there was a 
fiscal stimulus: real spending is now nearly 4% higher than at the peak of the boom. On this 
measure the stimulus was highest in 2009Q1. Though declining since then it has remained 
positive.  
 
Budget	deficits	
In the boom period from 2000Q1 to 2008Q1, net lending by the government (central and 
local) averaged minus 1.69% of GDP, i.e. there was a budget deficit. In the period since then 
 
accordance with the official methodology for calculating chain-linked GDP, the weights for 
2011 to the present are those of 2010.  
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net lending by the government has averaged minus 8.01% (Table 8 and Chart 9). In other 
words since the crisis began there has been a huge blow-out in the budget deficit. The latter, 
though falling, is still considerably larger than in France, a country where unemployment 
(11.1% in December 2013) is much higher and which has supposedly been pursuing 
Keynesian, anti-austerity policies. The deficit is currently larger than in some countries such 
as Greece which the financial markets regard as basket cases.  
  Of course the present UK government has not exactly chosen to run a deficit as large as 
this. Its size is largely a function of the automatic stabilisers kicking in as GDP fell. But 
clearly with the exception of a rise in VAT the coalition government has done little to 
counteract the automatic stabilisers and also as we have seen has not yet substantially cut real 
spending on goods and services. The continuing large deficits have meant that the debt-GDP 
ratio has risen at a (to me at least) alarming rate. Public Sector Net Debt, one measure 
employed by the Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR), was 75.1% of GDP in March 
2013. Between 1987 and 2007 it had hovered around 40% of GDP (Office for Budget 
Responsibility, 2013). The OBR projects that on current “austerity” policies the net debt ratio 
will peak at 85.6% in 2016-2017. This projection assumes that government keeps to its 
spending plans and that the Bank of England succeeds in keeping inflation at the 2% target 
for the CPI.  
  In summary, reports of savage cuts seem greatly exaggerated. Fiscal policy has reinforced 
monetary policy and has been mildly expansionary. Consequently, it is unlikely that 
“austerity” can explain much if any of the productivity puzzle. Of course, it is always 
possible to argue that government expenditure should have been even higher given the depth 
of the recession. But any proposal for a more expansionary fiscal policy than the present one 
should explain what the effect will be on the debt-GDP ratio and what the economic 
consequences will be of any significant increase in that ratio, which is anyway expected to 
rise substantially on current policies.23  
 
 
 
23  For further discussion of fiscal policy and the UK’s debt ratio, including the fascinating 
“expansionary contraction” of 1945-6, see Oulton (2013b).  
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4 The long run effects of banking crises: evidence from cross-country 
panel data  
 
All the candidate explanations for the productivity puzzle discussed in the previous two 
sections arguably all relate to the short-term effects of the financial crisis and the slump 
which followed it. Even the “crippled banks and zombie firms” hypothesis which relies 
directly on a malfunctioning banking system suggests only short term effects: when the 
banking system is restored to health these effects will disappear. So I turn now to possible 
long term effects. I start by reviewing evidence and theory on the long term effects of 
financial (particularly banking) crises. Then I summarise the findings of a recent cross-
country panel analysis covering 61 countries over 1950-2010 (Oulton and Sebastiá-Barriel 
2013).  
 
4.1 Previous	empirical	findings	on	financial	crises	
 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) find that based on data for 44 countries spanning about 200 
years, GDP growth rates fall as the gross central government debt-GDP ratio rises (they 
assign the debt/GDP ratios to four buckets: below 30%, 30-60%, 60-90% and above 90%). 
The growth effects are similar in advanced and emerging economies.24 Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2012) argue that the negative association between debt-GDP ratios and growth cannot be 
entirely due to cyclical effects (recessions causing high debt) since low growth is highly 
persistent in highly-indebted countries (so high debt is causing low growth). The very 
pessimistic case of Figure 1 finds some support in Broadberry and Crafts (1992) who argue 
that the Great Depression cast a long shadow over the British economy since it led to 
productivity-reducing policies such as protection and cartelisation of industries. 
  A number of other studies, e.g. Cerra and Saxena (2008), Furceri and Mouragane (2012), 
Barrell et al. (2010), Papell and Prodan (2011) and IMF (2009, chapter 4), also find that the 
recovery from financial crises is very slow. For example, Papell and Prodan (2011) argue that 
“The preponderance of evidence for episodes comparable with the current US slump is that, 
while potential GDP is eventually restored, the slumps last an average of nine years.” Like 
Barrell et al. (2010), they argue that advanced countries are different from developing ones: 
the latter can and do suffer permanent damage from severe financial crises. The claim that 
 
24 My interpretation takes into account the critique of the published results by Herndon et al. 
(2013) and the subsequent response by Reinhart and Rogoff (2013).  
Commented [47]:  
Slightly revised version of Oulton-Sebastia-Barriel.shorter.docx. 
(Main change: Reinhart-Rogoff bit revised and reference to their JEP 
2012 added).  
 
Oulton-Sebastia-Barriel.shorter.docx was shortened version of our 
DP, for submission to journal and for Montreal and Sydney 
conferences. Compared to the DP, UK part was cut, and OLS 
regression results omitted, i.e. only Arellano-Bond estimates 
presented.  
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advanced countries are relatively immune to the effects of financial crises is based on the 
evidence for the period since the Second World War. However, based on a study of nearly 
200 recession episodes in 14 advanced countries between 1870 and 2008, Jordà et al. (2012) 
find that more credit-intensive booms tend to be followed by deeper recessions and slower 
recoveries.  
 
4.2 Long	run	effects	of	financial	crises:	theory	
 
Why might we expect long-run effects from financial crises? A number of factors might 
reduce the long-run level of potential GDP, and of potential GDP per hour, even when 
recovery from the recession is complete (in the sense that GDP is growing at its long-run rate 
and unemployment is at a level consistent with a constant rate of inflation):  
 
1. Reinhart and Rogoff (2011) argue that financial crises have a tendency to raise the 
stock of government debt relative to GDP, either because of the cost of recapitalising 
failed banks or because government expenditure is not cut in proportion to reduced 
tax revenues. High levels of debt require high levels of taxation to service the debt 
and this may lead to efficiency losses; also high debt interest payments may crowd out 
socially productive public expenditure if there is resistance to higher taxes (Barro 
1979).  
 
2. In the recent boom, real interest rates were very low, reflecting a mis-pricing of risk. 
When the recovery is complete and official rates return to normal levels, the rates at 
which firms can borrow are likely to be higher due to an additional risk premium. So 
they will want to hold a lower level of capital in relation to output. Suppose that the 
real interest rate (the required return on capital) rises from (say) 7% to 9%. The 
depreciation rate averaged over all types of capital can be taken to be 8%. Then the 
cost of capital rises from (7 + 8 =) 15% to (9 + 8 =) 17%, i.e. by 13.3%. The elasticity 
of capital with respect to its cost is minus 0.4 according to Barnes et al. (2008). And 
the elasticity of output with respect to capital is about 1/3 (the profit share). So the 
effect of the rise in the real interest rate on the long-run level of GDP is (13.3 x -0.4 x 
1/3) = -1.8%. This calculation suggests that the effect is not negligible.   
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3. Higher unemployment during the recession reduces the human capital of the 
unemployed, by preventing them from gaining the experience that would raise their 
productivity. Of course, this effect eventually disappears when the affected workers 
leave the labour force (through emigration, retirement or death) and are replaced by 
workers who enter the labour market after the Great Recession is over. But even if not 
permanent, this effect could clearly be long-lasting since youth unemployment has 
risen particularly sharply in many countries. Suppose that an additional 3.5% of the 
labour force becomes unemployed as a result of the Great Recession, that this higher 
rate of unemployment lasts for a period of 5 years, and that each additional 
unemployed person is unemployed for one year. This is equivalent to (5 x 3.5 =) 
16.5% of the labour force losing one year’s experience. If the rate of return to 
experience is (say) 7% per year (which is consistent with estimates of the return to 
schooling), then the effect on GDP is a reduction of (16.5 x 0.07 x 2/3 =) 0.8%.  
 
4. There could be a long-run effect on the level of TFP. According to this argument the 
amount of innovation taking place in the economy is temporarily reduced by the 
recession. Innovation is implemented through or accompanied by investment in 
intangibles (e.g. R&D, in-firm training, or expenditure of management time on 
corporate restructuring) or it could take the form of new entrants into an industry 
bringing new products, new technology or new business methods. All this is 
(arguably) what lies behind TFP growth as conventionally measured (Corrado et al. 
(2009); Marrano et al. (2009)). Now since innovation is a cumulative process and 
since the supply of workers and entrepreneurs capable of innovating is inelastic, a 
reduction in innovation in one period cannot easily be made up in a subsequent one: 
in other words, less innovation today means that the future level of TFP is 
permanently lower. For illustration, suppose that prior to a crisis, assumed to last one 
year, the economy is capable of generating a stream of innovations a, b, c, ... from the 
current year t onwards. As a result of the crisis the first innovation a is now delayed to 
year t+1; the subsequent innovations b, c, ... are now also delayed one year to years 
t+2, t+3, ... . Though all innovations are eventually introduced the level of TFP will 
clearly be lower in every year after the crisis is over than it would have been in the 
absence of the crisis. A reduction in the TFP level will also lead to a secondary effect, 
a reduction in the desired level of capital, again reducing labour productivity.  
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  These are of course just illustrative calculations. What we need is a theoretical framework 
which would allow us to assess the size of any such effects empirically.  
 
4.3 A	theoretical	framework	
 
It is important to adopt a theoretical specification which allows financial crises to have both 
short-run and long-run effects and for the latter to be on both the level and the growth rate of 
productivity. It will then be an empirical issue how large or small these effects are. A fairly 
general framework for productivity growth can be written as follows:  
 (16) 
Here  is the log of the level of (labour) productivity in the i-th country,  is the log of the 
long-run productivity level in that country (long-run is indicated by a star (*)),  is a 
one-zero dummy indicating the presence or absence of a financial crisis, and  is a mean-
zero error term. The first term on the right-hand side, , is a simple partial 
adjustment mechanism whereby a fraction  of the gap  between actual and long-run 
productivity is removed each period, presumably through investment in the broad sense. The 
second and third terms,  and , reflect persistence in 
productivity growth: aggregate demand takes a while to recover from a recession so factor 
utilisation is lowered which reduces productivity growth till recovery begins; also investment 
is depressed for a while. The third term, , is the short-run effect of a financial crisis 
on productivity growth. It may reflect a temporary disruption to credit which further reduces 
investment. We expect that . Note that for the equation to make sense in the long run, 
the sum of the coefficients on the first three terms on the right-hand side must equal 1 and the 
specification imposes this restriction.  
  A simple model of the long-run productivity growth rate is:  
  (17) 
Here  is a country-specific fixed effect and  is a time effect common across countries. 
The long run effect of financial crises on productivity levels is measured by the parameter  
which is expected to be negative. The long-run growth rate is temporarily influenced by a 
financial crisis only while the latter is on-going. Once a crisis is over, it ceases to influence 
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the long-run growth rate (since then ). But even when the crisis is over, the long 
run productivity levels  will be lower than they would otherwise have been. A 
more complex model would allow the long run growth rate also to be permanently affected 
by a crisis. But this seems to be asking too much of the data.  
  In summary, in the specification suggested here, a financial crisis may have a temporary 
effect on the productivity growth rate (measured by  in equation (16)) and hence a 
temporary effect on the productivity level. A financial crisis may also have a permanent 
effect on the productivity level (measured by  in equation (17)). But there is no permanent 
effect on the productivity growth rate. The latter is assumed to be dependent on other factors 
such as the world-wide development of science and technology and the country’s own 
institutions, all of which are assumed independent of financial crises.  
  To obtain an estimating equation, substitute equation (17) into (16), lag equation (16) 
once and subtract the result from (16). Then after some manipulation we get :  
          (18) 
In econometric form this can be written as  
  (19) 
The relationship between the underlying parameters and the coefficients (the ) is:  
  (20) 
The first line of (20) shows that the specification imposes a restriction on the coefficients on 
lagged productivity growth:  
  (21) 
If this restriction is not imposed then there will be two possible estimates of the underlying 
parameter . From (20), these two estimates are  
  (22) 
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  The main interest in what follows attaches to the size of the long-run effect of financial 
crises, i.e. the absolute size of .  
 
4.4 Productivity	and	financial	crises:	data	
 
We use the data on financial crises gathered and analysed by Reinhart and Rogoff (2009). 
The actual data are taken from spreadsheets accompanying their book which are publicly 
available at http://terpconnect.umd.edu/~creinhar. The productivity data derive from The 
Conference Board’s Total Economy Database (TED) for 2011 which is also publicly 
available online at http://www.conference-board.org/data/ economydatabase.25  
 
The	Reinhart-Rogoff	database	of	financial	crises	
Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), hereafter R-R, have gathered data for six types of crisis (see 
their chapter 1): 1. Currency; 2. Inflation; 3. Stock market; 4. External debt; 5. Domestic 
debt; 6. Banking.  Each crisis is measured by a dummy variable, equal to one when a country 
is judged to be in this type of crisis and 0 otherwise. Their data cover 63 countries over the 
period 1800-2010. We use just the data from 1950 onwards, i.e. the potential number of 
observations is 61 x 63 =3843.  
  Here I report results just for banking crises which R-R define as follows: “(1) bank runs 
that lead to the closure, merging or takeover by the public sector of one or more financial 
institutions and (2) if there are no runs, the closure, merging, takeover or large-scale 
government assistance of an important financial institution (or group of institutions) that 
marks the start of a string of similar outcomes for other financial institutions.”. This is 
because some of the other R-R crises might be considered consequences of banking crises, 
e.g. a stock market crash. Or they might be thought of as responses (whether market-induced 
or policy-induced). For example, the sharp fall in sterling which accompanied the Great 
Recession and the UK banking crisis was a market response (though unlike many currency 
crises in developing or emerging countries it was against the background of an inflation-
targeting rather than an exchange-rate-targeting monetary regime). So for the United 
Kingdom the fall in sterling was not a crisis but part of the adjustment process. Banking 
crises on the other hand are very hard to predict: models designed to do so have a poor fit 
even in sample (Corder and Weale (2011)). 
 
25  For further details on data, sources and methods, see Oulton and Sebastiá-Barriel (2013).  
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  For each of the six types of crisis the percentage of total years for which countries were in 
crisis has increased between the first and second halves of the whole 61-year span 1950-
2010. The increase in frequency is particularly sharp for banking crises: over 1950-1979 only 
0.9% of country-years was spent in a banking crisis but this rose to 19.8% over 1980-2010 
(Oulton and Sebastiá-Barriel 2013, Table 3). The major events were the Latin American debt 
crises of the 1980s, the Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998 and the current global financial 
crisis.  
 
Output	and	productivity		
The 2011 version of The Conference Board’s Total Economy Database (TED) contains 
national accounts data for 128 countries covering the period 1950-2010, though with missing 
values for some countries. Labour productivity is available for most countries over the whole 
61 year period in heads form but for a much smaller number of countries in hours form. 
Hours are better than heads but we do not want to confine the analysis to the richer countries 
with better statistics. So we use GDP per person engaged (GDP per worker). We construct a 
measure of capital per worker by applying the PIM to a total investment series from the 
national accounts data underlying the Penn World Table; we assumed an 8% depreciation 
rate. Then we constructed the growth of TFP as the growth of GDP per worker minus the 
share-weighted growth of capital per worker; capital’s share was taken to be 1/3. Finally, 
population is available also from the TED and we used this to construct GDP per capita.  
  After merging the R-R data in with the TED, we lose about half the countries included in 
the latter. There are now 61 countries for which we have both labour productivity and crises 
data for at least some of the 61 years (in fact an average of about 53 years per country, with 
the missing years being mostly in the 1950s and 1960s). The 61 countries cover the whole 
planet, not just the OECD; 23 countries are classified as developed and 38 as developing.26  
 
4.5 The	effect	of	crises:	regression	results		
 
Sub-section 4.3 set out a framework within which the average short and long-run effects of 
crises across our sample can be estimated. We now seek to test this model using the dataset 
 
26  The data used to generate the results reported below can be found in Stata and Excel 
format at 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/workingpapers/2013/wp470.aspx.   
Commented [48]: Programs for this version:  cross-country 
results from TFP  – recession\Programs. 
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just described. We ran the regression specified in equation (19) with successively the growth 
of GDP per worker, the growth of capital per worker, the growth of TFP, and the growth of 
GDP per capita as the dependent variable. The right hand side variables were the banking 
crisis dummy, the banking crisis dummy lagged, two lags of the dependent variable, country 
fixed effects, and year dummies. Full details of the results are in Oulton and Sebastiá-Barriel 
(2013). Here we report results just for the parameter of most interest, , which measures the 
effect of a banking crisis on the long run level of the dependent variable.  These results come 
from estimating (19) by the Arellano-Bond (difference) method; OLS estimates are similar. 
  The first column of Table 9 reports the results for the full sample (all countries and all 
years). Let us consider first the effect on GDP per worker. The solution for  says that a 
banking crisis has a long-run, permanent impact on the level of productivity: it reduces it by 
about 1.1% for each year that the crisis lasts. In other words a crisis lasting five years would 
reduce the level of GDP per worker by (5 x 1.1% =) 5.5%, permanently. Of course, the 
estimated effects are for an “average” crisis as experienced by these 61 countries over the 
period 1955-2010. The estimate of  is significant at the 1% level.  
  The remaining columns of Table 9 report various sensitivity tests:  
Column (2):  exclude the Great Recession (2008-2010).  
Column (3):  exclude countries affected by the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98.  
(Korea, Malaysia, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, Thailand, Indonesia, India, Philippines, and 
China).  
Column (4):  exclude countries affected by the Latin American debt crisis of the 
1980s (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Columbia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, 
Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela).  
Column (5):  developed countries only (23 countries).  
Column (6):  developing countries only (34 countries). 
Column (7):  early years only (all countries, 1950-1979).  
Column (8):  later years only (all countries, 1980-2010).  
  Still sticking with GDP per worker (the top panel of Table 9), the size of  varies in an 
interesting way across these sub-samples, though with two exceptions it is always large 
numerically and negative. Excluding the Great Recession reduces  numerically from minus 
1.096 to minus 1.005, or by 4%, surprisingly little; this may be partly due to the fact that our 
observation period ends in 2010. Excluding the Latin America countries roughly halves the 
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size of  numerically;  now also fails to be significant.27 This may be another way of 
saying that these countries managed their crises of the 1980s comparatively poorly. If the 
regression is run on developed countries only then  is positive and insignificant (column 5). 
An optimistic interpretation is that developed countries possess institutions able to deploy 
policies capable of neutralising the effect of banking crises. A more pessimistic interpretation 
is that these countries have up till now suffered only mild and isolated crises, e.g. the United 
Kingdom’s secondary banking crisis of the 1970s. Or if the crisis was quite severe, as 
Sweden’s was in 1991-1994, it was against a benign international background. So for the 
developed countries past experience will not necessarily be a reliable guide to the effects of 
the present crisis, especially when we consider that the developed countries in our sample 
include Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain. That suggests we should place more weight on 
the full sample results. Finally,  is positive and insignificant when the regression is run just 
over the first half of the observation period, 1950-79 (column 7). As we have already seen, 
banking crises were much less frequent then.  
  What are the channels through which banking crises damage productivity? In the present 
framework there are two: by reducing capital per worker or TFP. The results for capital per 
worker appear in the second panel of Table 9 and can be seen to be very similar to the results 
for GDP per worker, both overall for the whole sample and for the various sub-samples. But 
now  is significant (at the 10% level) even when Latin America is excluded. (However,  
is not significant when only developed countries are included). So a reduction in the long-run 
level of the capital stock per worker seems to be a consequence of a banking crisis and helps 
to explain the earlier finding of a long-run reduction in labour productivity. But this does not 
necessarily rule out a channel running from TFP, since a long-run reduction in TFP would 
also induce a long-run reduction in capital per worker. And these estimates of the fall in 
capital per worker are too small by themselves to account for the fall in GDP per worker: if 
we weight the capital effect by capital’s share (say one third), then the capital channel can 
explain only about a third of the hit to GDP per worker. Looking down to the next panel of 
Table 9, we see that a banking crisis does indeed reduce the level of TFP. In the full sample, 
it reduces it by 0.81% for each year of crisis. Again, the effect is not significant for developed 
countries.  
 
 
27 This is a Latin American effect since excluding each Latin American country in turn one 
by one has little effect on the size and significance of .  
40 
 
Effects	on	GDP	per	capita	via	labour	force	participation	
 
A possible criticism of our results is that the effects on labour productivity that we find may 
reflect differences across countries in labour market institutions.28 In some countries the 
response of employment to a shock to output may be smaller than in others. Adjustment may 
be smaller either because of labour market rigidities which make it hard to fire people or 
because of real wage flexibility which reduces the incentive to do so. One way to look at this 
is to consider the effect of a financial crisis on GDP per capita rather than on GDP per 
worker. The relationship between the two is: GDP per capita = GDP per worker times the 
employment ratio (workers as a proportion of the population). So in countries where 
employment is cut when output falls there will be a fall in the employment ratio.  
  There is another reason why the employment ratio may fall. If a banking crisis reduces 
TFP and there is also an induced fall in capital per worker, then the demand for labour shifts 
to the left. Unless labour supply is completely inelastic there will be a fall in employment 
relative to population.  
  We can test for this by running our regression equation (19) with the dependent variable 
redefined as GDP per capita instead of GDP per worker. We find that the long-run effect of a 
banking crisis on GDP per capita is substantially larger than the effect on GDP per worker 
and more significant: see the lowest panel of Table 9. One year of a banking crisis reduces 
the long-run level of GDP per capita by 1.79%. The effect is highly significant, at the 1% 
level, even when Latin America is excluded. When only developed countries are included in 
the regression, the long-run effect is lower though still large, a reduction of -0.79%, and this 
is significant at the 5% level. In other words, part of the effect of a banking crisis comes in 
the form of a long-run fall in the employment ratio (whether due to higher unemployment or 
inactivity rates).29  
 
4.6 Conclusions	on	crises	
 
The results suggest that banking crises as defined by Reinhart and Rogoff have on average a 
substantial and statistically significant effect on the long-run level of labour productivity. The 
 
28  We owe this point to Chris Pissarides.  
29  IMF (2009) also finds long-lasting effects on the employment ratio following a financial 
crisis as do Furceri and Mourougane (2012).   
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long-run level of labour productivity is reduced by about 1.1% for each year that the crisis 
lasts.30 There is also a substantial and statistically significant effect on the long-run level of 
GDP per capita, a reduction of 1.79% for each year of crisis. That is, the long run 
employment ratio also falls. This effect is statistically significant overall and also for just the 
developed countries.  
 Two qualifications should be noted. First, the crisis variable is a one-zero dummy. We have 
no measure of the severity of crises, other than the circular one of observing their 
consequences. Second, it is part of the maintained hypothesis that crises do not affect the long 
run productivity growth rate. I attempt to address this second qualification in the next section.  
 
 
5 Two case studies: the United States and Japan 
 
I now consider two case studies, the US after the Great Depression of the 1930s and Japan 
after the bubble burst in 1990. As we shall see, the US case provides evidence that growth 
can eventually resume at its previous trend rate, albeit after a massive hit to the level of GDP. 
This is consistent with the maintained hypothesis of the previous section. The Japanese case 
to the contrary seems to support the view that the long run growth rate can be permanently 
affected by a financial crisis.  
 
5.1 The US after the Great Depression of the 1930s 
 
The Great Depression started in the US in 1929, the peak-to-trough decline in GDP was about 
27%, and real output did not surpass its 1929 level till 1937 (Crafts and Fearon 2010). Perron 
(1989) studied the question of whether US GDP has a unit root, i.e. whether it is trend 
stationary or difference stationary. He found that it was trend stationary: after a one-off shock 
like the Great Depression is properly taken into account, the US growth rate reverts to its 
long run trend. But this means that the Great Depression (which was also accompanied by a 
banking crisis) reduced the long-run level of US GNP but left the long-run growth rate 
unchanged. In fact, though this was not the focus of his study, it is possible to deduce from 
 
30  No such significant long-run effects were found for the five other types of financial crisis 
distinguished by Reinhart and Rogoff, if these latter were not accompanied by a banking 
crisis (Oulton and Sebastiá-Barriel 2013).  
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his results that the hit to the GDP level was about 17%: see his Table VII and his parameter 
 in particular. Ben-David et al. (2003) report similar results.  
  This result leads to a paradoxical conclusion. Suppose that in 1937 you had been asked to 
project the long run future growth of the US economy. Naturally you would look at past 
GDP. But as it turned out you would have made a much better forecast if you had only 
looked at data up to 1929 and ignored everything that had happened afterwards. This would 
have been a brave thing to do in 1937 and no doubt you would have been regarded as a very 
foolish person by sensible people.  
  Why didn’t the Great Depression cast an even longer shadow? One reason may be that 
the policy changes which it induced were not too bad for long run growth. True, the US slid 
into protectionism (the Smoot-Hawley tariff introduced under the Hoover administration) but 
in a large economy this had a less deleterious effect than similar policies did in smaller 
European countries. Some of the Roosevelt administration’s more damaging policies, such as 
price-fixing and cartelisation of industry, were rolled back by the courts. The administration 
also passed legislation making it easier for unions to organise and get recognised. But US 
industry never conceded control over working practices on the shop floor to the unions to the 
extent that UK industry did and some union gains in this area were rolled back after 1945 
(Ulman 1968, page 333, citing earlier work by Slichter, Healy and Livernash). By contrast in 
the UK protection and cartelisation in the 1930s were followed by nationalisation of key 
industries in the 1940s; together with increased union power, all this arguably hampered UK 
growth (Broadberry and Crafts 1992). Finally it is interesting to note that the US debt-GDP 
ratio was quite low on the eve of the Great Depression. While it more than doubled during the 
1930s, this was from a low base. The total gross central government debt-GDP ratio was 
16.3% in 1929 and still only 43.9% in 1939.31 Part of the reason why the debt did not rise by 
more was that (as is well-known) Keynesian fiscal policies were not actually employed by 
Roosevelt.32   
 
 
31  Source for debt ratios: a spreadsheet named 20_data.xls, available from Carmen 
Reinhart’s website (http://www.carmenreinhart.com/data/browse-by-country/countries/ 
united-states), accessed 23/08/2013. 
32  See Crafts and Fearon (2010) for an overview of the US experience, also the more 
detailed articles in this special issue of the Oxford Review of Economic Policy, especially 
Hannah and Temin (2010).  
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5.2 Japan after the bubble burst in 1990 
 
It is often said that Japan has suffered twenty years of stagnation since the bubble burst in 
1990. And Japan is often pointed to as an example of the dire consequences of a financial and 
banking crisis. So my contention that in the long run the UK growth rate will be unaffected 
by our own banking crisis might seem questionable in the light of the Japanese case.  
  However, while Japan is certainly a cautionary tale, the Japanese performance has not in 
fact been quite as bad as it is often made out to be. Using annual data, the bursting of the 
bubble did not lead to an actual fall in GDP: in other words, any fall in output was swiftly 
made up within the year. It is true that GDP fell in 1998 and 1999, but this was hardly a direct 
result of the bubble bursting; it is usually associated with a temporary fiscal tightening and 
contagion from the Asian financial crisis. Apart from that episode post-bubble GDP grew 
steadily if slowly right up till the global financial crisis hit in 2008 (Chart 10). However, the 
growth rate of GDP has been much lower after the bubble than before (Table 10): between 
1970 and 1990, GDP grew at 4.14% p.a., but between 1990 and 2007 at only 1.33% p.a. A 
closer look shows that this is partly due to a slower growth of employment which in turn is 
due to a slower growth of population (coupled with ageing). But the really striking change is 
the fall in hours and in hours per worker (Chart 10). In 1990, the average Japanese worker 
worked 2031 hours per year; by 2007 this had fallen to 1785 hours, a decline of 12%. Out of 
34 countries in The Conference Board’s Total Economy Database for which hours data are 
available, Japan came 7th in 1990 in the length of the working year. By 2007 its rank had 
fallen to 19th (Table 11). The consequence is that the growth rate of GDP per hour worked 
was still a respectable 2.06% p.a. post-bubble (and a bit faster in the market sector, see Chart 
4), even though down from 3.64% pre-bubble. By contrast, GDP per worker grew at only 
1.30% p.a. (see Table 10 and Chart 11).33  
 
33  Curiously, neither Krugman (1998) nor Koo (2008) mentions the fall in hours worked. 
Nor has either anything to say about productivity, though Krugman does mention the 
possibility that TFP growth has fallen. By contrast, Hayashi and Prescott (2002) do discuss 
the fall in hours worked and cite a law of 1988 mandating a gradual cut in the workweek 
from 44 to 40 hours. They also dispute the credit crunch or “zombie banks” explanation for 
the productivity slowdown: “There is no evidence of profitable investment opportunities not 
being exploited due to lack of access to capital markets. The problem then and today is a low 
productivity growth rate.” But Hayashi and Prescott offer no explanation for the fall in the 
TFP growth rate. Nor do they discuss fiscal policy and the possible role of rising debt in 
reducing the efficiency of the Japanese economy.  
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  The fall in hours worked in Japan was certainly large. But hours worked were falling in 
most of these 34 countries over the same period: see Table 11. Whatever the reasons for the 
steady decline in hours worked in the Japanese case, it is difficult to associate it directly with 
the bursting of the bubble. It looks more like a belated adjustment to the rich country norm.  
  How does Japan’s growth of GDP per hour compare with that of other countries? Table 
11 gives the answer for the periods 1959-73, 1973-1990 and 1990-2007. In 1959-73 Japan 
was growing much faster than the average of these countries (8.11% p.a. versus 4.64% p.a.), 
in 1973-1990 its growth was again more rapid, at 3.21% p.a. compared to 1.38% p.a., but in 
1990-2007 its performance was average, 2.06% p.a. versus 2.10% p.a. In the last period 
labour productivity in Japan was still growing more rapidly than in other large, rich countries 
like Canada, France, Italy and the US, though not so rapidly as in the UK. So we might 
interpret Japan’s slowing productivity growth not as a consequence of its financial crisis but 
as a result of its exhausting the opportunities for catch-up.34  
  This is probably too optimistic an interpretation. Data on the growth of Japanese TFP 
(value added basis) are available from the EU KLEMS database, November 2009 release, for 
1973-2006 (http://www.euklems.net/euk09ii.shtml). They show that for the whole economy 
TFP grew at 1.46% p.a. over 1973-1990 but at only 0.05% p.a. for the post-bubble period 
1990-2006. The corresponding figures for manufacturing are 3.65% p.a. and 0.63% p.a. So 
there has been a huge slowdown in TFP growth. The sense that the Japanese economy has 
been malfunctioning is strengthened by looking at the real rate of return to capital in the 
market sector. Chart 12, also derived from the EU KLEMS database, shows this to have 
fallen steadily since 1990. As Koo (2008) has amply documented, the Japanese government 
has applied an endless series of fiscal stimuli since the bubble burst. The deleveraging 
undertaken by the corporate and household sectors after asset prices collapsed has been offset 
by huge government budget deficits. This was good in a way since it probably prevented a 
large rise in unemployment. It is widely believed however that much of the stimulus has gone 
into construction projects of dubious social value (“bridges to nowhere”). And the upshot is 
that Japan now has one of the highest debt-GDP ratios in the world. The gross general 
government debt-to-GDP ratio rose from 68.0% in 1990 to 225.9% in 2010.35 This may be 
 
34  By 1990 Japan’s GDP per capita had reached 81% of the US level (source: The 
Conference Board Total Economy Database, 2011 release).  
35  Source: Reinhart-Rogoff data available at Carmen Reinhart’s website 
(http://www.carmenreinhart.com/data/browse-by-country/countries/japan/).; accessed 19 
August 2013.  The net ratio was a lot lower (about 110%), but net ratios can be problematic. 
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sustainable, in the sense that the government is not about to go bust and will continue to meet 
its debt obligations, partly through financial repression and (perhaps) higher inflation.36 But 
the high and rising debt-GDP ratio may not have been costless: it may have induced 
inefficiencies in capital markets which have lowered the rate of return to capital and 
introduced frictions into the normal process of creative destruction. Arguably, TFP growth 
has slowed as a result.  
  In summary, though the Japanese experience is not as bad as it is often portrayed, it does 
provide some evidence for financial crises reducing the growth rate of productivity over a 
lengthy period, in this case 17 years (after which of course Japanese growth has plunged still 
further in the wake of the world-wide financial crisis). But it may be that the way the 
Japanese government dealt with the crisis, by large fiscal stimuli leading to a high and still 
growing debt-GDP ratio, has also played a role in reducing long run growth. This may in fact 
be an illustration of the point made by Crafts (2013), that the long run effects of financial 
crises depend very much on how policy responds, and these responses may either promote or 
hinder growth (see also Broadberry and Crafts, 1992).  
 
 
6 Conclusions 
 
Before the financial crisis British growth prospects looked bright. Labour productivity was 
growing faster in the UK than in our major competitors and British performance on other 
dimensions such as inflation, employment and unemployment was good. I have presented a 
projection of UK labour productivity growth (output per hour), based on a two-sector model 
and calibrated entirely on pre-crisis data. This projection is for the market sector (i.e. 
excluding government and government-financed activities like health and education). The 
projected figure is 2.61% p.a. About a fifth of future growth is projected to derive from the 
falling prices of ICT equipment from which the UK can continue to gain as a freely trading 
 
For example, the net ratio is much lower than the gross one in the US, one reason being that 
the former excludes federal government debt held by the social security fund. But the net rate 
also excludes the liabilities of the social security fund which are of course enormous. There 
was presumably a reason why the framers of the Maastricht treaty set the maximum 
acceptable debt-GDP ratio at 60% in gross not net terms.  
36  Hansen and Imrohoroglu (2013) argue that Japanese fiscal policy is unsustainable on its 
present trajectory since it would require average tax rates of the order of 40-60% in the near 
future (2020 onwards).  
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nation. The projected growth rate is a little slower than the rate actually achieved over the 
period 1990-2007, 2.87% p.a., mainly because I am projecting that the ICT price will fall 
more slowly in the future.  
  The crisis has called all this into question. Not only has growth stopped but the level of 
labour productivity has actually fallen and is still (at the end of 2013) below the level 
achieved during the boom. In other words six years after the recession began the recovery is 
still incomplete, an unprecedented situation for Britain. I have examined nine hypotheses put 
forward to explain the productivity puzzle. These were  
1. Reallocation of labour to sectors with lower productivity  
2. Excessive influence of hard-to-measure sectors 
3. Mis-measurement of GDP due to mis-measurement of banking output 
4. Overheating in the boom 
5. Lower physical capital input 
6. Lower human capital input 
7. Labour/capital hoarding 
8. Crippled banks and zombie firms 
9. Austerity 
The first four hypotheses are essentially measurement issues. I found that none of them holds 
water. The reallocation effects are negligible and eliminating the hard-to-measure sectors 
leaves the puzzle intact. Banking output may have been mis-measured but this does not mean 
that GDP was mis-measured. There is little evidence that demand was pressing on supply 
during the boom, still less that there was increasing pressure on supply. Likewise both 
physical and human capital per hour worked have increased not decreased since the recession 
began in 2008Q1. Similarly it is hard to blame austerity for reducing labour productivity 
since contrary to the common perception government expenditure on goods and services has 
increased, not fallen, since 2008Q1. Also the government budget has been in substantial 
deficit thus allowing the automatic stabilisers to play a role. All this has been accompanied by 
highly supportive monetary policy (with Bank Rate almost at the ZLB plus QE) and a steep 
fall in the exchange rate.  
  That leaves labour or capital hoarding and financial frictions, the latter either in the form 
of reduced funding to business or excessive forbearance to zombie firms. The strongest 
argument against labour hoarding is that it is implausible that it should continue for six years 
after the recession began, and also be accompanied by rising employment and hours worked 
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since mid-2010. Rather than labour it may be capital that is being hoarded, so that the 
effective amount of capital per unit of labour has fallen, motivated by the fall in real wages. 
But this explanation is speculative since we have no adequate measure of capital utilisation.  
  Turning to financial frictions, certainly bank lending to business has been reduced and 
this may well be part of the explanation of why business investment has fallen. But this has 
already been taken into account in the discussion of capital input. Keeping zombie firms alive 
on a financial drip may have reduced productivity but the size of this effect has yet to be 
quantified. In any case, in a slump loss-making firms are not necessarily low productivity 
firms. At the moment we lack the micro evidence to assess the strength of this hypothesis.  
  Arguably, all the hypotheses just summarised relate to short-term effects. So when the 
economy does eventually recover, what will be the long-term effect of the financial crisis? 
Theory suggests that banking crises can have long-lasting effects. One plausible mechanism 
is through a temporary interruption in TFP growth (or more broadly, innovation) which 
cannot be made up later. A cross-country panel analysis suggests that banking crises do 
indeed have long-lasting effects: they cause a fall in the long run level of labour productivity 
while leaving its long run growth rate unaffected. They also lead to a long run fall in the 
levels of capital per worker, TFP and employment. This finding corresponds to the 
“pessimistic” scenario of Figure 1. For each year of a banking crisis as defined by Reinhart 
and Rogoff (2009), the long run levels of GDP per worker, capital per worker, TFP, and GDP 
per head are reduced by respectively 1.10%, 1.14%%, 0.81% and 1.79%. For a crisis lasting 
(say) five years, the reduction in levels is five times the one year effect. These are the average 
effects across all countries.  
  In the panel analysis it was just assumed that the long run growth rate was unaffected by 
banking crises since testing this hypothesis seemed to be asking too much of the data. So 
instead I took a case study approach and looked at the experience of the United States after 
the Great Depression of the 1930s and of Japan after the bubble burst in 1990. In the US case 
the long run growth rate does not seem to have been affected even though the long run GDP 
level took a huge hit (a 17% reduction). In the Japanese case, there was certainly a big fall in 
the growth rate of GDP after 1990 and up to 2007. But much of this was due to a fall in hours 
worked per worker. The growth rate of output per hour remained good by international 
standards. Nevertheless output per hour grew much less rapidly after 1990 than before, as did 
TFP. So there is certainly a case to be made that the bursting of the bubble reduced the long 
run growth rate in Japan.  
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  So why the difference between the Japanese and US cases? One possibility is the 
response of the Japanese government to the crisis: tight monetary policy accompanied by 
very lax fiscal policy. The former led to declining prices (negative inflation) over the 1990-
2007 period. The latter led to a steeply rising government debt-to-GDP ratio which has now 
reached over 225%. I argued (tentatively) that the distorting effects of high debt may have led 
to the sharp decline in Japanese TFP growth since 1990.  
  The following hypothesis should therefore be considered as a topic for further research. 
Expansionary fiscal policy in the aftermath of a banking crisis may succeed in raising output 
and employment, but if it leads to excessive debt levels it will reduce long term growth. So 
there may be a trade-off between output and employment today and growth tomorrow. 
Applying this argument to the UK, whether or not the UK will revert to its projected long 
term growth rate of GDP per hour (2.61% p.a. in the market sector) will depend on the 
government debt-GDP ratio not rising excessively. Even so, the cross-country evidence 
suggests that, assuming the banking crisis lasted five years and that the UK is an “average” 
country, the UK will suffer a permanent hit to the level of GDP per worker of about 5½% and 
an even larger hit to the level of GDP per capita of about 9%.  
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TABLES 
 
Table 1  
Output, hours, jobs and productivity in the UK in and after the Great Recession 
(2008Q1 = 100) 
 
Year and 
quarter GDP Hours Jobs 
Hours per 
job 
GDP per 
hour 
GDP per 
job 
2008Q1 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
2008Q2 99.39 99.76 100.31 99.45 99.63 99.08 
2008Q3 97.93 99.34 99.84 99.50 98.58 98.09 
2008Q4 95.69 99.22 99.57 99.65 96.44 96.10 
2009Q1 93.30 97.49 99.15 98.33 95.70 94.10 
2009Q2 92.71 97.51 98.17 99.33 95.07 94.43 
2009Q3 92.67 97.02 98.16 98.84 95.52 94.41 
2009Q4 92.97 98.31 98.06 100.25 94.57 94.81 
2010Q1 93.54 96.20 97.63 98.54 97.23 95.81 
2010Q2 94.45 98.03 98.48 99.54 96.36 95.91 
2010Q3 94.95 98.13 99.08 99.04 96.76 95.83 
2010Q4 94.69 98.54 98.70 99.84 96.09 95.94 
2011Q1 95.07 98.56 99.27 99.28 96.46 95.77 
2011Q2 95.30 97.42 99.25 98.16 97.82 96.03 
2011Q3 95.91 98.21 98.78 99.42 97.66 97.09 
2011Q4 95.84 98.42 98.84 99.58 97.39 96.97 
2012Q1 95.85 99.13 99.68 99.45 96.69 96.15 
2012Q2 95.36 99.62 100.10 99.52 95.73 95.27 
2012Q3 96.09 100.75 100.42 100.33 95.37 95.68 
2012Q4 95.88 101.02 101.19 99.83 94.91 94.75 
2013Q1 96.11 101.28 100.71 100.57 94.89 95.44 
 
Source:     GDP from Quarterly National Accounts June 2013; hours and jobs from Labour 
Market Statistics, July 2013. GDP is at basic prices, chained volume measure [ONS cdid: 
ABMM].  
 
Commented [NO9]: aust2.do 
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Table 2 
Projected growth rates of GDP per hour for the UK market sector derived  
from one-sector and two-sector models  
(parameter values calibrated on pre-crisis data) 
 
Description  Parameter Method Value 
 
Theory 
Measure-
ment   
TFP growth rate 
(whole economy)   
Mean, 1990-
2007 0.0114 
TFP growth rate 
(consumption 
sector) 
  Mean, 1990-2007 0.0087 
ICT income share   HP trend (level) 0.0641 
ICT output share   HP trend  (level) 0.0183 
Labour share   Mean, 1990-2007 0.7301 
Rate of decline of 
ICT price   
HP trend 
 (growth rate) -0.0590 
Growth rate of skill   Mean, 1990-2007 0.0057 
Projected growth 
rates of GDP per 
hour 
 
   
One-sector model   Equation (4) 0.0213 
Two-sector model   Equation (14) 0.0261 
 
Source  Parameter values derived from pre-crisis UK data in EU KLEMS (November 
2009 release, available at www.euklems.net). Rate of decline of relative price of ICT ( ) 
from pre-crisis data from U.S. NIPA (www.bea.gov). Projected growth rates derived using 
equations (4) and (14). See text for details.  
lnB
C ln CB
ICTK
v
ICTw ICTw
1 Lv
C ICT ln p
hg hg
ln y
ln y
ln p
Commented [n10]:  Estimates in table from aust.xls. Originally 
estimated in uk.do and usictpriuces.do. HP trend for output share 
calculated by hand from UK data in all_data.dta.  
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Table 3  
Sectoral breakdown of the UK economy in 2007 
 
 
SECTOR 
Share of 
GDP, % 
Share of 
total 
hours, % 
Relative 
product-
ivity, ratio 
A Agriculture, forestry & fishing 0.6 1.6 0.39 
B Mining & quarrying inc. oil & gas 2.5 0.3 10.65 
C Manufacturing 11.1 10.9 1.01 
D Electricity, gas, steam, etc 1.3 0.4 2.93 
E Water supply, sewerage, etc 1.1 0.5 2.19 
F Construction 7.7 8.4 0.91 
G Wholesale & retail trade 11.5 15.0 0.76 
H Transport & storage 4.8 5.3 0.91 
I Accommodation & food services 2.9 5.4 0.54 
J Information & communication 6.0 4.3 1.34 
K Financial & insurance activities 8.3 4.1 2.07 
L Real estate 8.7 1.4 6.37 
M Professional, scientific & tech. activities 7.3 7.5 0.96 
N Administrative & support activities 4.5 7.5 0.59 
O,P,Q Government services 18.4 22.7 0.81 
R Arts, entertainment & recreation 1.5 2.2 0.67 
S-U Other services & household activities 1.8 2.4 0.72 
 TOTAL 100.0 100.0 1.00 
 
Source  Office for National Statistics.  
Note  Classification is in accordance with SIC 2007. Relative productivity is GDP share 
divided by hours share. Sectors in Bold Italic are those described in the text as “problematic” 
for various reasons. Output of Real estate includes the imputed rent of owner-occupiers. 
Government services include Public Administration and defence, Education, and Health and 
social services. Relative productivity is GDP share divided by hours share, i.e. value added 
per hour in the sector in question divided by value added per hour in the whole economy.  
Commented [411]: Programs for this version: UK sectoral 
results from Productivity-RES/Programs-July-2012. Source: 
shares.do and shares.xlsx 
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Table 4  
Estimates of labour productivity (GVA per hour) for broad sectors:   
ratio of GDP per hour in (a) the trough of the recession (2009Q3) and (b) the latest 
period (2013Q1) to GDP per hour in the previous peak  
(2008Q1=100.0)  
  
Whole 
economy 
Market 
sector (GDP 
exc. O, P 
and Q) 
Market sector, 
exc. 
problematic 
sectors  
(A, B and K) 
Whole 
economy, 
holding 
labour 
shares	at	
2007 values 
Ratios (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Trough (2009Q3) to 
peak (2008Q1) 95.52 95.31 94.54 95.89 
Latest period 
(2013Q1) to peak 
(2008Q1) 
94.89 94.93 96.23 94.19 
 
Source  Office for National Statistics. Column (1) from Table 1; columns (2)–(4) from 
data underlying the Productivity Bulletin, June-July 2013. See text for further explanation.  
 
Commented [n12]: memex.do 
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Table 5  
Estimates of capital per hour in the UK market sector in and after the Great Recession:  
ratio of current level to previous peak in 2007Q4 (2007Q4=100.00) 
 
 
Based on old (pre-July 2013) series  
for NPEL 
Based on new(July 2013) series  
for NPEL 
 Quarterly depreciation rate Quarterly depreciation rate 
Year and 
quarter 0.02063 0.01535 0.025996 0.02063 0.01535 0.025996 
2007Q4 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
2008Q1 98.63 98.62 98.63 98.86 98.81 98.91 
2008Q2 101.23 101.21 101.23 101.58 101.50 101.65 
2008Q3 102.19 102.20 102.18 102.37 102.34 102.39 
2008Q4 104.30 104.34 104.25 104.12 104.19 104.04 
2009Q1 107.05 107.15 106.93 106.42 106.63 106.19 
2009Q2 108.01 108.21 107.79 107.61 107.87 107.32 
2009Q3 108.56 108.88 108.22 108.01 108.42 107.58 
2009Q4 108.64 109.09 108.18 108.10 108.63 107.55 
2010Q1 109.69 110.23 109.13 109.16 109.77 108.52 
2010Q2 108.57 109.22 107.91 107.94 108.68 107.18 
2010Q3 108.17 108.91 107.41 107.45 108.30 106.58 
2010Q4 107.59 108.43 106.74 106.70 107.67 105.71 
2011Q1 108.19 109.15 107.23 107.03 108.16 105.89 
2011Q2 109.35 110.40 108.29 108.10 109.34 106.86 
2011Q3 108.85 109.98 107.73 107.45 108.78 106.13 
2011Q4 108.78 109.97 107.60 107.14 108.57 105.72 
2012Q1 108.67 109.93 107.43 107.06 108.57 105.58 
2012Q2 108.44 109.76 107.16 106.51 108.10 104.95 
2012Q3 107.55 108.91 106.22 105.40 107.07 103.77 
2012Q4 107.74 109.18 106.36 105.06 106.87 103.30 
2013Q1 .. .. .. 104.46 106.42 102.58 
 
Notes Capital stock estimated by the Perpetual Inventory Method applied to quarterly 
Business investment (CVM; ONS cdid: NPEL), 1987Q1-2012Q4 (old series) or 1987Q1-
2013Q1 (new series). The initial capital stock is estimated by an iterative method: see text for 
details. Market sector hours are from an ONS spreadsheet underlying the Productivity 
Bulletin. The quarterly depreciation rates of 0.02063, 0.01535 and 0.025996 correspond to 
annual rates of respectively 8%, 6% and 10%.  
Commented [n13]: PIMcrude.xlsx 
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Table 6 
Real average weekly earnings, 2008Q1=100.0  
 
 
Private 
sector 
Public 
sector 
Whole 
economy 
2008Q1 100.0 100.0 100.0 
2008Q2 99.2 101.1 99.6 
2008Q3 98.4 100.9 99.0 
2008Q4 96.8 99.7 97.4 
2009Q1 92.8 99.7 94.3 
2009Q2 96.4 100.8 97.3 
2009Q3 94.5 100.5 95.8 
2009Q4 94.8 101.1 96.3 
2010Q1 94.4 100.9 95.7 
2010Q2 94.6 102.2 96.3 
2010Q3 94.5 101.6 96.0 
2010Q4 94.8 102.1 96.4 
2011Q1 95.8 103.1 97.4 
2011Q2 95.7 102.9 97.4 
2011Q3 95.4 102.6 96.8 
2011Q4 95.9 102.8 97.3 
2012Q1 95.1 102.5 96.8 
2012Q2 96.3 103.0 97.5 
2012Q3 96.4 103.9 97.8 
2012Q4 95.6 103.1 97.0 
2013Q1 93.4 101.9 95.6 
 
Note:  Average weekly earnings (seasonally adjusted monthly data, converted to quarterly) 
deflated by GDP deflator.   
Sources: Average weekly earnings from Labour Market Statistics, July 2013; 
GDP deflator from Quarterly National Accounts, June 2013 (at basic prices, calculated as 
ABML/ABMM).  
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Table 7 
Real government expenditure on goods and services: official versus Keynesian measures 
(2008Q1=100.00)  
 
 Official Keynesian 
Year and 
quarter CVM CVM CVM 
Deflated by 
GDP deflator 
Deflated by 
wage index 
(AWE) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Current Capital Total Total Total 
2008Q1 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
2008Q2 100.41 99.08 100.29 99.62 100.62 
2008Q3 101.27 98.72 101.02 100.15 101.14 
2008Q4 102.49 100.67 102.31 101.98 104.19 
2009Q1 101.57 111.50 102.55 103.90 108.79 
2009Q2 101.29 103.63 101.54 101.66 103.43 
2009Q3 101.97 116.02 103.41 104.23 107.99 
2009Q4 102.29 120.73 104.14 103.32 106.78 
2010Q1 101.99 115.73 103.42 102.80 107.34 
2010Q2 102.49 108.50 103.24 101.85 105.86 
2010Q3 102.37 112.87 103.55 101.21 105.48 
2010Q4 102.29 110.36 103.24 101.47 105.53 
2011Q1 102.23 110.39 103.19 102.48 106.17 
2011Q2 102.39 95.67 101.99 97.18 100.73 
2011Q3 101.94 100.56 102.10 97.47 101.97 
2011Q4 102.38 95.73 102.01 97.99 102.05 
2012Q1 105.15 107.55 105.73 101.93 106.62 
2012Q2 104.19 109.10 105.01 96.68 100.17 
2012Q3 105.08 99.13 104.89 97.73 101.09 
2012Q4 105.90 101.52 105.87 98.26 102.90 
2013Q1 106.01 95.45 105.35 97.87 103.71 
 
Source  Government current spending (central and local government), nominal and real, 
and GDP deflator (at market prices, YBHA/ABMI) from Quarterly National Accounts, June 
2013. Government investment, nominal and real, from corrected figures in Business 
investment, Q1-2013 results (Office for National Statistics 2013b). The “total official” 
measure is my own calculation and is a chained-linked Laspeyres index of the official current 
and capital expenditure series. Average weekly earnings index from Office for National 
Statistics (2013a).  
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Table 8  
Mean net lending by sector as % of GDP  
 
 2000Q1-2008Q1 2008Q2-2013Q1 
Government -1.69 -8.01 
Corporations 2.17 5.29 
Households -2.50 0.61 
Rest of world 2.02 2.00 
 
Source: ONS, Quarterly National Accounts, June 2013. GDP is at market prices. 
Government is central and local government combined.  
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Table 9 
Long run percentage effects on levels of GDP per worker, capital per worker, TFP, and 
GDP per capita of one year spent in a Reinhart-Rogoff banking crisis  
(estimates of  derived from equation (19), estimated by Arellano-Bond (difference) 
method; standard errors in parentheses)  
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Variable 
affected by 
crisis 
All 
countries 
and years 
Exc. Great 
Recession Exc. Asia 
Exc. Latin 
America 
Developed 
countries 
only 
Developing 
countries 
only 1950-79 1980-2010 
GDP per 
worker                  
100 x   -1.096*** -1.005*** -1.112*** -0.550 0.362 -1.258*** 0.831 -1.231*** 
(s.e.) (0.356) (0.380) (0.417) (0.382) (0.278) (0.467) (1.954) (0.382) 
         
Capital per 
worker          
100 x  -1.137*** -1.419*** -0.997** -0.755* -0.0423 -1.677*** -0.832 -1.229*** 
(s.e.) (0.411) (0.462) (0.405) (0.392) (0.379) (0.397) (1.122) (0.418) 
         
TFP         
100 x  -0.813** -0.718** -0.807** -0.373 0.394 -0.864** 1.019 -0.854** 
(s.e.) (0.340) (0.341) (0.379) (0.329) (0.288) (0.437) (1.916) (0.358) 
         
GDP per 
capita          
100 x  -1.794*** -1.574*** -1.849*** -1.444*** -0.789** -1.773*** 0.390 -1.875*** 
(s.e.) (0.372) (0.386) (0.406) (0.396) (0.386) (0.495) (2.170) (0.410) 
 
Note *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard error for  estimated by Stata’s nlcom 
procedure. Fixed effects, year dummies and constant included in all regressions. In the full 
sample (“All countries and years”) the number of countries is 61, the period is 1950-2010 (61 
years) and the total number of observations is 3277; 23 countries are classified as developed 
and 38 as developing. For full details of estimation results, data sources and methods, see 
Oulton and Sebastiá-Barriel (2013). The data can be found at:  
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/workingpapers/2013/wp470.aspx.  
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Table 10  
Japan: average annual growth rates before and after the bubble, % p.a. 
 
 1970-1990 1990-2007 
GDP 4.14 1.33 
Population 0.84 0.18 
Employment 0.87 0.02 
Hours 0.51 -0.74 
GDP per head 3.30 1.15 
GDP per worker 3.27 1.30 
GDP per hour 3.64 2.06 
 
Source: The Conference Board, Total Economy Database, 2011 release.  
(http://www.conference-board.org/data/economydatabase).  
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Table 11  
Hours worked per worker per year (number) and growth rate of  
GDP per hour (% p.a.): 34 countries 
 
 Hours worked per worker Growth rate of GDP per hour 
Country 1990 2007 % change 1959-73 1973-90 1990-2007 
Argentina 1850 1841 -0.5 3.42 -0.73 2.80 
Austria 1832 1678 -8.4 6.02 2.45 2.11 
Belgium 1652 1560 -5.6 5.84 2.57 1.65 
Brazil 1879 1841 -2.0 3.39 1.37 1.27 
Canada 1788 1735 -3.0 2.10 1.05 1.42 
Chile 1984 2168 9.3 2.53 0.41 2.17 
Colombia 1969 1956 -0.7 2.88 1.33 1.27 
Denmark 1525 1547 1.4 3.74 2.31 1.53 
Finland 1769 1706 -3.6 5.15 2.95 2.72 
France 1705 1556 -8.7 5.42 3.07 1.75 
Germany 1572 1430 -9.0 5.25 2.98 1.95 
Greece 2233 2115 -5.3 7.96 2.00 2.30 
Hungary 1945 1985 2.1 .. 1.73 3.06 
Iceland 1839 1808 -1.7 4.27 2.44 1.90 
Ireland 2179 1869 -14.2 5.04 4.01 3.68 
Italy 1867 1816 -2.7 7.22 2.40 0.92 
Japan 2031 1785 -12.1 8.11 3.21 2.06 
Mexico 2121 2177 2.6 3.47 -0.47 0.80 
Netherlands 1508 1389 -7.9 5.47 2.29 1.65 
New Zealand 1759 1704 -3.1 2.06 -0.14 1.17 
Norway 1502 1419 -5.5 4.61 3.06 2.18 
Peru 1930 1926 -0.2 3.85 -2.67 2.96 
Poland 1750 2078 18.7 .. -3.76 3.16 
Portugal 1839 1942 5.6 7.15 1.77 1.26 
Romania 1638 1878 14.7 .. -9.56 2.99 
Singapore 2318 2307 -0.5 6.36 3.26 2.52 
Spain 1742 1636 -6.1 6.60 4.04 1.14 
Sweden 1561 1618 3.7 4.36 0.97 2.29 
Switzerland 1700 1643 -3.4 3.51 1.12 1.05 
Taiwan 2364 2166 -8.4 6.49 6.04 4.48 
Turkey 2057 1918 -6.8 4.64 3.80 3.86 
United Kingdom 1783 1673 -6.2 3.48 2.20 2.87 
United States 1724 1709 -0.9 2.49 1.25 1.83 
Venezuela 1889 1931 2.2 1.08 -1.79 0.73 
       
Mean 1847 1809 -1.9 4.64 1.38 2.10 
 
Source: The Conference Board, Total Economy Database, 2011 release.  
(http://www.conference-board.org/data/economydatabase).  
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FIGURES AND CHARTS  
 
Figure 1 
Hypothetical paths for GDP per hour during recession and recovery 
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Chart 3  
 
Chart 4  
 
Source  EU KLEMS, November 2009 release (www.euklems.net).  
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Chart 5  
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Chart 12 
 
Source: Oulton and Rincon (2012), based on EU KLEMS database (November 2009 release, 
www.euklems.net).  
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